World Watch Research

Iraq: Full Country Dossier

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Introduction

World Watch List 2021

| Rank | Country | Private life | Family life | Community life | National life | Church life | Violence | Total Score WWL 2021 | Total Score WWL 2020 | Total Score WWL 2019 | Total Score WWL 2018 | Total Score WWL 2017 |
|----------|--------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|----------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | North Korea | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 11.1 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 92 |
| 2 | Afghanistan | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 10.2 | 94 | 93 | 94 | 93 | 89 |
| 3 | Somalia | 16.5 | 16.7 | 16.6 | 16.6 | 16.3 | 9.8 | 92 | 92 | 91 | 91 | 91 |
| 4 | Libya | 15.6 | 15.4 | 15.9 | 16.3 | 16.3 | 12.4 | 92 | 90 | 87 | 86 | 78 |
| 5 | Pakistan | 13.9 | 14.2 | 15.1 | 14.9 | 13.5 | 16.7 | 88 | 88 | 87 | 86 | 88 |
| 6 | Eritrea | 14.6 | 14.9 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 15.4 | 11.1 | 88 | 87 | 86 | 86 | 82 |
| 7 | Yemen | 16.6 | 16.6 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 3.9 | 87 | 85 | 86 | 85 | 85 |
| 8 | Iran | 14.5 | 14.5 | 13.9 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 10.6 | 86 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 |
| 9 | Nigeria | 13.3 | 13.2 | 13.9 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 16.7 | 85 | 80 | 80 | 77 | 78 |
| 10 | India | 13.0 | 12.9 | 13.5 | 14.9 | 13.7 | 15.4 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 81 | 73 |
| 11 | Iraq | 13.6 | 14.6 | 14.2 | 14.8 | 13.8 | 11.5 | 82 | 76 | 79 | 86 | 86 |
| 12 | Syria | 13.3 | 13.9 | 13.5 | 14.5 | 14.0 | 12.0 | 81 | 82 | 82 | 76 | 86 |
| 12 | Sudan | 13.4 | 13.4 | 13.7 | 14.5 | 14.0 | 9.1 | 79 | 85 | 87 | 87 | 87 |
| 15 | Saudi Arabia | 15.4 | 13.4 | 14.4 | 15.8 | 16.6 | 2.2 | 79 | 79 | 77 | 79 | 76 |
| 14 | Maldives | 15.4 | 15.5 | 13.9 | 15.8 | 16.6 | 0.4 | 77 | 79 | 78 | 79 | 76 |
| 15 | Egypt | 12.5 | 13.2 | 11.5 | 12.7 | 10.0 | 14.1 | 75 | 76 | 76 | 78 | 65 |
| 10 | China | 12.5 | 9.7 | 11.5 | 13.2 | 11.0 | 14.1 | 74 | 70 | 65 | 57 | 57 |
| | | | | | | | - | 74 | | 71 | | |
| 18 | Myanmar | 11.9 | 12.0 | 13.1 | 12.9 | 12.3 | 11.9 | | 73 | | 65 | 62 |
| 19 | Vietnam | 12.1 | 8.8 | 12.7 | 14.0 | 14.5 | 10.0 | 72 | 72 | 70 | 69 | 71 |
| 20 | Mauritania | 14.3 | 14.0 | 13.5 | 14.1 | 13.6 | 1.9 | 71 | 68 | 67 | 57 | 55 |
| 21 | Uzbekistan | 15.1 | 12.9 | 14.1 | 12.2 | 15.7 | 1.3 | 71 | 73 | 74 | 73 | 71 |
| 22 | Laos | 12.1 | 10.2 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 14.3 | 6.9 | 71 | 72 | 71 | 67 | 64 |
| 23 | Turkmenistan | 14.5 | 11.3 | 13.8 | 13.3 | 15.7 | 1.5 | 70 | 70 | 69 | 68 | 67 |
| 24 | Algeria | 13.9 | 13.9 | 11.5 | 13.1 | 13.4 | 3.9 | 70 | 73 | 70 | 58 | 58 |
| 25 | Turkey | 12.5 | 11.5 | 10.8 | 13.3 | 11.6 | 9.3 | 69 | 63 | 66 | 62 | 57 |
| 26 | Tunisia | 12.0 | 13.1 | 10.4 | 11.5 | 13.2 | 7.4 | 67 | 64 | 63 | 62 | 61 |
| 27 | Morocco | 12.6 | 13.5 | 11.2 | 12.4 | 14.1 | 3.7 | 67 | 66 | 63 | 51 | 49 |
| 28 | Mali | 9.4 | 8.2 | 12.7 | 10.3 | 11.5 | 15.4 | 67 | 66 | 68 | 59 | 59 |
| 29 | Qatar | 14.0 | 13.9 | 10.8 | 13.1 | 14.1 | 1.5 | 67 | 66 | 62 | 63 | 66 |
| 30 | Colombia | 11.4 | 8.8 | 12.4 | 11.0 | 9.7 | 13.9 | 67 | 62 | 58 | 56 | 53 |
| 31 | Bangladesh | 11.5 | 10.3 | 13.0 | 11.3 | 10.1 | 10.6 | 67 | 63 | 58 | 58 | 63 |
| 32 | Burkina Faso | 9.4 | 9.7 | 12.0 | 9.4 | 11.8 | 14.3 | 67 | 66 | 48 | - | - |
| 33 | Tajikistan | 14.0 | 12.3 | 11.9 | 12.5 | 13.2 | 2.2 | 66 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 58 |
| 34 | Nepal | 12.4 | 9.7 | 9.9 | 13.0 | 12.3 | 8.5 | 66 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 53 |
| 35 | CAR | 9.0 | 8.6 | 13.1 | 9.6 | 9.9 | 15.6 | 66 | 68 | 70 | 61 | 58 |
| 36 | Ethiopia | 9.9 | 8.5 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 10.8 | 14.4 | 65 | 63 | 65 | 62 | 64 |
| 37 | Mexico | 10.3 | 8.1 | 12.4 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 12.6 | 64 | 60 | 61 | 59 | 57 |
| 38 | Jordan | 13.1 | 13.9 | 11.4 | 11.6 | 12.4 | 2.0 | 64 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 63 |
| 39 | Brunei | 13.9 | 14.6 | 10.7 | 10.9 | 13.5 | 0.7 | 64 | 63 | 63 | 64 | 64 |
| 40 | DRC | 8.0 | 7.9 | 11.2 | 9.4 | 11.6 | 16.1 | 64 | 56 | 55 | 33 | - |
| 41 | Kazakhstan | 13.2 | 11.5 | 11.0 | 12.5 | 13.4 | 2.4 | 64 | 64 | 63 | 63 | 56 |
| 42 | Cameroon | 8.8 | 7.6 | 12.6 | 7.0 | 12.3 | 15.7 | 64 | 60 | 54 | 38 | - |
| 43 | Bhutan | 13.1 | 12.1 | 11.9 | 12.7 | 13.8 | 0.0 | 64 | 61 | 64 | 62 | 61 |
| 44 | Oman | 13.2 | 13.5 | 10.3 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 0.9 | 63 | 62 | 59 | 57 | 53 |
| 45 | Mozambique | 9.3 | 7.6 | 11.3 | 7.9 | 11.1 | 16.1 | 63 | 43 | 43 | - | - |
| 46 | Malaysia | 12.1 | 14.3 | 12.9 | 11.5 | 10.0 | 2.4 | 63 | 62 | 60 | 65 | 60 |
| 47 | Indonesia | 11.5 | 11.4 | 12.4 | 10.7 | 9.3 | 7.8 | 63 | 60 | 65 | 59 | 55 |
| 48 | Kuwait | 13.2 | 13.5 | 9.9 | 12.2 | 13.2 | 1.1 | 63 | 62 | 60 | 61 | 57 |
| 40 49 | Kenya | 11.7 | 9.2 | 10.5 | 8.0 | 10.3 | 12.8 | 62 | 61 | 61 | 62 | 68 |
| 49 50 | Comoros | 12.5 | 11.1 | 10.3 | 11.3 | 10.3 | 12.8 | 62 | 57 | 56 | 56 | 56 |

| Rank | Country | Private life | Family life | Community life | National life | Church life | Violence | Total Score WWL 2021 | Total Score WWL 2020 | Total Score WWL 2019 | Total Score WWL 2018 | Total Score WWL 2017 |
|------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|----------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 51 | Cuba | 10.9 | 7.7 | 11.8 | 12.9 | 13.4 | 5.4 | 62 | 52 | 49 | 49 | 47 |
| 52 | Sri Lanka | 12.2 | 9.1 | 11.7 | 12.2 | 9.7 | 7.0 | 62 | 65 | 58 | 57 | 55 |
| 53 | UAE | 13.4 | 13.3 | 9.7 | 12.0 | 12.4 | 1.1 | 62 | 60 | 58 | 58 | 55 |
| 54 | Niger | 9.4 | 9.5 | 13.3 | 7.2 | 11.6 | 10.6 | 62 | 60 | 52 | 45 | 47 |
| 55 | Kyrgyzstan | 12.9 | 10.3 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 12.0 | 1.3 | 58 | 57 | 56 | 54 | 48 |
| 56 | Palestinian Territories | 12.5 | 13.3 | 9.1 | 10.4 | 11.7 | 0.9 | 58 | 60 | 57 | 60 | 64 |
| 57 | Tanzania | 9.3 | 10.8 | 10.3 | 8.6 | 8.7 | 10.2 | 58 | 55 | 52 | 53 | 59 |
| 58 | Russian Federation | 12.3 | 8.0 | 10.2 | 10.5 | 12.1 | 3.9 | 57 | 60 | 60 | 51 | 46 |
| 59 | Djibouti | 12.3 | 12.3 | 10.3 | 10.0 | 11.2 | 0.0 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 57 |
| 60 | Bahrain | 12.1 | 12.5 | 9.1 | 10.7 | 10.5 | 0.9 | 56 | 55 | 55 | 57 | 54 |
| 61 | Azerbaijan | 12.8 | 9.8 | 9.4 | 11.1 | 12.6 | 0.0 | 56 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 52 |
| 62 | Chad | 11.5 | 8.2 | 10.2 | 9.6 | 10.3 | 3.7 | 53 | 56 | 48 | 40 | - |
| 63 | Nicaragua | 6.9 | 4.6 | 9.9 | 11.3 | 10.0 | 8.1 | 51 | 41 | 41 | - | - |
| 64 | Burundi | 5.1 | 5.8 | 9.7 | 9.2 | 9.6 | 8.9 | 48 | 48 | 43 | - | - |
| 65 | Uganda | 8.1 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 9.1 | 12.0 | 47 | 48 | 47 | 46 | 53 |
| 66 | Guinea | 10.3 | 7.5 | 8.3 | 7.0 | 8.1 | 5.9 | 47 | 45 | 46 | - | - |
| 67 | Honduras | 6.8 | 5.0 | 10.6 | 7.6 | 9.0 | 7.6 | 46 | 39 | 38 | | |
| 68 | Angola | 6.4 | 3.6 | 7.0 | 10.1 | 11.4 | 7.2 | 46 | 43 | 42 | - | - |
| 69 | South Sudan | 5.7 | 1.5 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 7.8 | 15.0 | 43 | 44 | 44 | - | - |
| 70 | Gambia | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 8.3 | 8.8 | 0.6 | 43 | 43 | 43 | - | - |
| 71 | Togo | 9.2 | 6.7 | 9.3 | 7.1 | 9.8 | 0.7 | 43 | 41 | 42 | - | - |
| 72 | Rwanda | 5.3 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 7.8 | 10.1 | 8.1 | 42 | 42 | 41 | - | - |
| 73 | Ivory Coast | 9.8 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 3.3 | 42 | 42 | 43 | - | - |
| 74 | El Salvador | 6.6 | 4.9 | 9.8 | 4.2 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 42 | 38 | 30 | | |

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Sources and definitions

- This country report is a collation of data and analysis based around Open Doors World Watch List (WWL) and includes statistical information on world religions, Christian denominations and people groups prepared by the World Christian Database (WCD).
- The highlighted links in the text can be found written out in full at the conclusion of each main section under the heading "External links".
- The WWL 2021 reporting period was 01 October 2019 30 September 2020.
- The definition of persecution used in WWL analysis is: "Any hostility experienced as a result
 of one's identification with Christ. This can include hostile attitudes, words and actions
 towards Christians". This broad definition includes (but is not limited to) restrictions,
 pressure, discrimination, opposition, disinformation, injustice, intimidation, mistreatment,
 marginalization, oppression, intolerance, infringement, violation, ostracism, hostilities,
 harassment, abuse, violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
- The latest update of WWL Methodology including appendices can be found on the <u>World</u> <u>Watch List Documentation</u> page of the Open Doors Analytical website (password: freedom).

Effect on data-gathering during COVID-19 pandemic

In the WWL 2021 reporting period, travel restrictions and other measures introduced by the governments of various countries to combat the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic did cause delays and create the need for restructuring grass-roots research in some cases. Through the agile cooperation of Open Doors field networks, research analysts, external experts and an increased use of technological options, Open Doors is confident that the WWL 2021 scoring, analysis and documentation has maintained required levels of quality and reliability.

External Links - Introduction

• Sources and definitions: World Watch List Documentation - http://opendoorsanalytical.org/world-watch-list-documentation/

WWL 2021 Short country profile / Iraq

Brief country details

| Iraq: Population (2020 UN estimate) | Christians | Chr% |
|-------------------------------------|------------|------|
| 41,503,000 | 175,000 | 0.4 |

Data source: Johnson T M and Zurlo G A, eds., World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed February 2020)

| Iraq: World Watch List | Points | WWL Rank |
|------------------------|--------|----------|
| WWL 2021 | 82 | 11 |
| WWL 2020 | 76 | 15 |
| WWL 2019 | 79 | 13 |
| WWL 2018 | 86 | 8 |
| WWL 2017 | 86 | 7 |

Scores and ranks are shown above whenever the country scored 41 points or more in the WWL 2017-2021 reporting periods

Dominant persecution engines and drivers

| Iraq: Main persecution engines | Main drivers |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Islamic oppression | Violent religious groups, One's own (extended) family, Citizens (people from the broader society), including mobs, Revolutionaries or paramilitary groups, Government officials, Political parties, Ethnic group leaders, Non-Christian religious leaders, Organized crime cartels or networks |
| Clan oppression | Ethnic group leaders, Revolutionaries or paramilitary groups, One's own (extended) family, Political parties, Non-Christian religious leaders |
| Dictatorial paranoia | Violent religious groups, Ethnic group leaders, Revolutionaries or paramilitary groups, Government officials, Political parties, Citizens (people from the broader society), including mobs |

| Organized corruption and crime | Violent religious groups, Organized crime cartels or networks, Government officials, Political parties, Citizens (people from the broader society), including mobs |
|--|--|
| Christian Denominational protectionism | Religious leaders of other churches, One's own (extended) family |

Engines and Drivers are listed in order of strength. Only Very strong / Strong / Medium are shown here.

Brief description of the persecution situation

The main focus of the pressure on Iraqi Christians following the territorial losses by the Islamic State group (IS) has been the Shia militias backed by Iran. However, in the first half of 2020, IS stepped up its attacks on civilians, infrastructure and security forces. In several areas of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), Turkey continued its air strikes and ground operations, reportedly targeting members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In June 2020, Christian villages were bombed in Turkey's largest operation in the area since 2015, forcing many Christians to flee. Christians were not protected by the local government. The main Turkish target is the PKK and Turkish forces attack whatever comes their way. In this respect, Christians are an easy and weak target to attack and get away with.

The Assyrian Church of the East, the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Syrian Catholic Church, the Chaldean Catholic Church and the Armenian Orthodox Church are all seriously affected by persecution, discrimination and intolerance, especially from militant Islamic groups and non-Christian leaders. They also face discrimination from government authorities. In central and southern Iraq, Christians often do not publicly display Christian symbols (such as a cross) as this can lead to harassment or discrimination at check-points, universities, work places and government buildings.

Several years ago, the Catholic seminary was no longer able to operate in Baghdad as a result of threats of kidnapping and attacks by Islamic militants and was forced to move to the IKR. Evangelical, Baptist and Pentecostal churches in Bagdad and Basra are also seriously affected by violence from radical Islamic groups and non-Christian leaders, and regularly experience discrimination from the authorities. Outspoken Christians have frequently become targets in central and southern Iraq. Blasphemy laws can be used against them too if they are suspected of carrying out outreach among Muslims.

Christians with a Muslim background experience most pressure from (extended) family and often keep their faith a secret as they risk being threatened by family members, clan leaders and the society around them. Converts risk losing inheritance rights and the right or means to marry. To openly leave Islam leads to difficult situations throughout the country, but can also be risky in the more moderate Islamic IKR. Changing church affiliation (e.g. by moving from an Orthodox to an Evangelical congregation) is also often punished by refusing rights and losing jobs. Leaders of Orthodox and Catholic churches have been known to refuse to perform marriages for members attending Evangelical churches.

Summary of international obligations and rights violations

Iraq has committed to respect and protect fundamental rights in the following international treaties:

- 1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
- 2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
- 3. <u>Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or</u> <u>Punishment</u> (CAT)
- 4. <u>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</u> (CEDAW)
- 5. <u>Convention on the Rights of the Child</u> (CRC)

Iraq is not fulfilling its international obligations by regularly violating or failing to protect the following rights of Christians:

- Christian converts from Islam are killed because of their new faith (ICCPR Art. 6)
- The law prohibits conversion from Islam (ICCPR Art. 18)
- Christian converts lose custody of their children and inheritance rights (ICCPR Art. 26)
- Children of Christian converts are registered as Muslims and forced to received Islamic education (ICCPR Art. 18 and CRC Art. 14)
- Christian female converts are forcibly married to Muslim men (ICCPR Art. 23; CEDAW Art. 16 and ICESCR Art. 10)

Specific examples of violations of rights in the reporting period

20 January 2020: Four co-workers of the French aid organization "SOS Chrétiens d'Orient" were abducted. The co-workers, three French and one Iraqi, were released on 26 March 2020.

9 March 2020: The Christian owner of a jewelry store in Baghdad was stabbed to death when his shop was attacked and looted. Although financial gain probably played a substantial role in this attack, it cannot be denied that Christians are minorities and there is no power to protect or defend them, thus making them an easy and vulnerable target.

July 2020: In Nahla Valley, a northern Iraqi region home to ethnic Assyrians, a court decision paved way for the expropriation of the land and buildings belonging to 117 Christian families.

The effects of Turkish military action: Since the beginning of 2020, approximately 25 predominantly Christian villages have been deserted. As a result at least 10 churches were closed. More than 200 Christians were displaced from their villages and homes in Zakho.

External Links - Short country profile

- Summary of international obligations and rights violations: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
- Summary of international obligations and rights violations: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx
- Summary of international obligations and rights violations: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment -
- https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx
- Summary of international obligations and rights violations: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx

• Summary of international obligations and rights violations: Convention on the Rights of the Child https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

WWL 2021: Keys to understanding / Iraq

Link for general background information

• Iraq country profile - BBC News

Recent history

Until the end of World War I, Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire. Britain occupied the territory in 1917. In 1932 Iraq became an independent kingdom and in 1958 an independent Republic. It has been governed by several authoritarian leaders. In the period 1979 - 2003, Iraq's president was Saddam Hussein, whose Sunni-led party dominated the Shia Muslim majority. Ethnic tensions have also been common in Iraq through the centuries and especially the large Kurdish presence (in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Russia) has been subject to sectarian violence. After the 2003 US-led invasion and the subsequent power vacuum, sectarian violence flared up particularly between Sunni and Shiite Muslims again and Christians were caught in the crossfire.

After the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, anti-Western and radical Islamic sentiments increased, which contributed to religious freedom violations against Iraqi Christians. A stream of refugees started leaving the country, which escalated with the advent of the Islamic State group (IS) and the establishment of its self-proclaimed caliphate in June 2014. After large parts of IS territory were reconquered in 2016, Christians started to return to the liberated and previously Christian-majority towns close to Mosul, like Qaraqosh. In December 2017 Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that Iraqi forces had defeated IS and driven it from Iraqi territory. However, the IS influence remains in the region.

In September 2017 Iraqi troops pushed back Kurdish forces in the north to stop plans by the government of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) to establish an independent Kurdistan.

After Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr won a majority in the parliamentary elections in May 2018, he chose Adel Abdul Mahdi as prime minister in October 2018. One year later, nationwide mass protests against corruption, unemployment and Iran's influence in many major cities left hundreds of protesters dead and led to the resignation of Mahdi. In May 2020, former head of the National Intelligence Service, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was appointed prime minister and his cabinet approved. Meanwhile protests continued, especially after al-Kadhimi announced reforms to tackle acute economic conditions in June. In July 2020, tensions between the US and Iraqi governments on the one side and Iranian-backed militias on the other intensified.

Since the territorial defeat of IS, the main source of pressure on Iraqi Christians has been from Shiite militias backed by Iran. However, IS also stepped up its attacks on civilians, infrastructure and security forces in the first half of 2020. Turkey also continued its air strikes and ground operations in several regions of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), allegedly to target members of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). Local residents have been suffering from this for several years but it has now intensified. In Turkey's biggest operation in the region since 2015, Christian villages were also bombed in June 2020 causing many Christians to flee.

Political and legal landscape

Economists Intelligence Unit's (EIU) <u>2019 Democracy Index</u> degraded Iraq from the 'hybrid regime' category to the 'authoritarian regime' category, based on "the violent unrest that erupted in October [2019] against corruption and unemployment".

Iraq is divided into two parts, a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in the north (Iraqi Kurdish Region - IKR), officially governed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) based in Erbil, and a large Arab part, controlled by the Iraqi Government in Baghdad. Iraq consists of 18 provinces/governorates, from these 18 provinces only five have an official population of Christians. Christians have left all other governorates, apart from small groups of converts with a Muslim background. Corruption pervades all levels of government and society. The weak and divided government only strengthens widespread impunity. In this situation, religious minorities - including Christians - are most vulnerable.

Sectarian conflicts are being fought both in parliament by political representatives and in the streets by militias. The political system developed under US guidance allocates a proportional percentage of Iraqi Senate seats to the nation's Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities (such as Christians, Turkmens, and Yazidis). The political representation of Christians is very low (1-3%) and they are distributed over 10 different parties. Both the Council of Representatives of the Government of Iraq as well as the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament, reserve five seats for Christians. While Saddam Hussein's Iraq was secular, now Islamist political parties have entered into Iraqi politics with Shiite and Sunni parties constituting the majority in parliament. Some Shiite parties have warm relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Christians in Iraq report that their country is becoming increasingly Islamic. Christians, in particular those with a Muslim background, have reported that they are being monitored by Iranian secret services.

The <u>Iraqi Constitution of 2005</u> establishes Islam as the state religion of Iraq, Islamic law as a source of legislation, and provides that no law may contravene either Islamic tenets, the principles of democracy or rights outlined in the Constitution. The Constitution upholds freedom from religious (as well as political and intellectual) coercion and requires the government to maintain the sanctity of religious sites, including Christian sites. Under applicable Islamic law, Muslims are effectively prohibited from changing their religion, and women registered as Muslim are not permitted to marry non-Muslims.

Christians in the country characterize the current political situation in Iraq as unstable. Major factors for this instability include the following:

- Widespread corruption;
- A nation split along sectarian lines;
- The failed attempt at Kurdish independence through a referendum in September 2017;
- The need to reconstruct the areas destroyed by IS;
- Tensions with Iran.

There is widespread societal unrest over the political state of the country and <u>major</u> <u>demonstrations</u> have taken place against the current government (Al-Jazeera, 10 May 2020).

The COVID-19 outbreak did not affect Christians any worse than other citizens; however, the crisis surrounding the pandemic has further contributed to the overall economic decline and political instability.

Religious landscape

| Iraq: Religious context | Number of adherents | % |
|---|------------------------|------|
| Christians | 175,000 | 0.4 |
| Muslim | 40,524,000 | 97.6 |
| Hindu | 4,800 | 0.0 |
| Buddhist | 360 | 0.0 |
| Ethno-religionist | 0 | 0.0 |
| Jewish | 20 | 0.0 |
| Bahai | 2,000 | 0.0 |
| Atheist | 73,000 | 0.2 |
| Agnostic | 215,000 | 0.5 |
| Other | 508,770 | 1.2 |
| OTHER includes Chinese folk, New religionist, Sikh, Spiritist, Taoist, Confucianist, Jain, Shintoist, Zoroastrian. | | |

Data source: Johnson T M and Zurlo G A, eds., World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed February 2020)

Iraq is an ethnically diverse nation with a Muslim population of 97.6% according to WCD 2020 estimates. The population consists of over 40.5 million Muslims, of which 64-69% are Shiites and 29-34% are Sunnis, according to the April 2020 <u>World Factbook</u>. Christians make up approximately 0.4% of the population.

Although there has been a geographical defeat of IS, the ideology and influence of IS is still strong. Sectarian polarization is on the rise. However, some Muslims are disillusioned with Islam and have become more open to explore the Christian faith.

Of the Arab population, Shiite Muslims form the majority. The Kurds in the north are mainly Sunni. It was only after the League of Nations decision in 1920 that the different ethnic groups were first brought together into a modern state system. The different leaders that have come to power since then have fueled mistrust and conflict according to the principle of 'divide and rule'. The current sectarian violence in Iraq is rooted mainly in the competition for power in the

post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

Symbolic political steps, such as the introduction of <u>Christmas as a national holiday</u> in December 2018 (CNN, 25 December 2018), were opposed by Islamic authorities such as the Grand Mufti of Baghdad, who said in a sermon that Christian holidays like Christmas are impermissible for Muslims and that those who celebrate them believe Christian doctrine.

Economic landscape

According to <u>UN Human Development Indicators</u>, (accessed 11 December 2020):

- The employment rate is low at 42.7% of the population over 15 years of age holding jobs.
- GNI is 17,789.

According to World Bank's May 2020 update:

- Iraq is in a vulnerable situation. As a result of the collapse in international oil prices combined with ongoing political and social unrest, it is facing a difficult fiscal crisis. The fast spread of COVID-19 has further aggravated the situation, especially as the country's healthcare system only has restricted capacity. As a result, a 5% contraction of Iraq's economy is expected for 2020.
- Iraq's persistent current account deficit is expected to be funded by the reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq and state banks, which makes the country's fragility rise in the short term.

According to <u>World Bank's Systematic Country Diagnostic</u> (3 February 2017), Iraq belongs in the 'Upper Middle Income' category.

There is widespread dissatisfaction with the lack of public services (for instance, the supply of water and electricity) and there is high unemployment. Corruption is also one of the major factors that is hampering the country's economic progress. Corruption in the public and private sectors carries very high risks for business investments. Moreover, many citizens are traumatized after years of suffering under Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iran-Iraq war, Gulf wars, sanctions, the US-led invasion and the sectarian violence (including atrocities committed by IS militants). The impact of this on the population - and especially on children - is disastrous. Many children have developed learning disorders and display other after-effects of trauma. All of these factors have led to previously middle-class Christians now struggling to survive economically. In addition, the Christian population was disproportionally hard-hit by displacement from Mosul and the Nineveh plain and has high numbers of IDPs or returnees now living in poverty. The fragile security situation - together with IS's continued presence and numerous small-scale attacks - has hampered economic recovery and badly needed development, which would help overcome sectarian and ethnic violence.

In the short-term, the <u>Economist Intelligence Unit</u> (EIU, accessed 14 September 2020) expects the economy to "contract by 6.3% in 2020, as oil revenue plummets, owing to a coronavirus-related fall in demand".

Social and cultural landscape

According to the <u>UNDP 2019 report</u> (page 300) and the <u>World Factbook</u> (accessed 27 January 2021):

- Main ethnic groups: Arab (75-80%), Kurds (15-20%) and 5% other ethnic groups.
- *Main languages:* Arabic and Kurdish are official languages. The following languages are official in areas where native speakers of these languages are the majority: Turkmen (a Turkish dialect), Syriac (Neo-Aramaic) and Armenian.
- Urban population: 70.9% of total population (2020).
- *Literacy rate:* 43.7%.

According to the UN Global Human Development Indicators (2019):

- *HDI score and ranking*: With a HDI score of 0.689 Iraq ranks 120 out of 189 countries and falls in the 'Medium Human Development' category. From 1990 to 2018, Iraq's HDI value rose from 0.574 to 0.689, a 20% increase.
- Life expectancy at birth: 70.5 years.
- Gender inequality Index (GII): With a score of 0.540, Iraq ranks 143 of 177 countries.
- *Education:* The expected number of years of schooling is 11.1, whereas the mean years of schooling is 7.3.
- **Unemployment:** 7.9% of the "labor force population ages 15 and older that is not in paid employment or self-employed but is available for work and has taken steps to seek paid employment or self-employment". For ages 15-24 this is as high as 16%.
- *IDPs/Refugees:* According to the UN Refugee Agency, more than 3.3 million Iraqis have been displaced across the country since 2014. Approximately 300.000 refugees fled to Iraq from neighboring countries, especially Syria.
- Humanitarian situation: Around 18% of the population some 6.7 million are in need of humanitarian help, including 3 million children. After four years of humanitarian crisis, millions of IDP families are reaching a breaking-point. Their financial means are now exhausted and the access to basic services is limited. At the same time, security risks continue to exist.

Society in Iraq continues to be conservative, tribal and driven by ethnic conflict. In general, Iraqi society is becoming more fragmented and Islamized. Especially in areas where IS had been in control, Christians report that they feel betrayed by their Muslim neighbors. As the Christian population dwindles, so do their freedoms. Christians and their way of life used to be more or less tolerated in Iraq, but the Christian community now reports increasing pressure from society. This includes more monitoring, the closing of shops during Ramadan and pressure on Christian women to veil themselves. In 2015, posters appeared on government office-buildings (and even on churches) encouraging Christian women to veil themselves "as this is what Mary did" (World Watch Monitor, 18 December 2015).

Christian IDPs in Kurdistan experience difficulties in integrating due to the language barrier. There is also a general lack of knowledge about social, political, religious and economic issues. Christians have reported exploitation at the workplace and housing market, including having to pay higher rents than non-Christians. Many IDPs have returned to their villages and cities after four years displacement and are faced with very limited access to community life as the social fabric of society has been destroyed. This has been a cause of depression, especially among the youth and women, impacting their capacity to improve community life and strengthen social cohesion.

Another factor which is likely to significantly influence social cohesion are the regulations connected to COVID-19. According to a report by the <u>UNDP</u> (UNDP, August 2020), "the pandemic will considerably strain social cohesion, widening existing fault lines and creating new ones." Also, student retention, learning and nutrition are likely to be affected as a result of the suspension of classes and feeding programs in schools.

Technological landscape

According to World Internet Stats (accessed June 2020):

- Internet usage: 52.9% penetration survey date: December 2019
- Facebook usage: 52.9% penetration survey date: February 2020

According to the World Bank's Country profile (2018):

• Mobile phone subscriptions: 95.0 per 100 people

In reaction to the continued political unrest, the Iraqi government has limited Internet access. Freedom House mentions the following example in the <u>2019 Report on Freedom in the World</u>: "In July 2018, the government reacted to protests in Basra by shutting down the Internet in a number of regions for several days, followed by a targeted restriction of access to social media platforms including WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. The move was intended to curb the protests and online criticism of the government."

Freedom of expression in Iraq, including via the Internet, came under pressure again in 2019 when the Iraqi parliament studied proposals for a new cyber-crime law. According to <u>Reporters</u> <u>Without Borders (RSF)</u>, this law "provides for prison sentences (including life imprisonment) for online posts that endanger the independence, unity or integrity of the country, or its economic, political, military or security interests". The media watchdog is especially concerned about the vagueness of this wording which is "liable to discourage the emergence of a really free and independent press" (RSF, accessed 14 September 2020).

The Christian community in Iraq has reported that the increased use of mobile phones and the Internet leads to a decreased level of social life, creates problems in the area of moral issues and has affected the level of education in general.

Security situation

Numerous crises have shaken Iraq and produced heavy storm-clouds: Collapsing oil revenues, increased tensions between the USA and Iran, the failure of political elites in Baghdad to address protesters' concerns and the spread of COVID-19 have all brought the country to the brink of collapse and have contributed to the massive frustration felt by the youth, who feel alienated and have no future prospects. There is a lack of foreign investment, widespread insecurity and a likely continuation of protests despite the COVID-19 crisis.

Violent Islamic groups such as IS and others (including Shia militants and militias loyal to Iran such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Mehdi Army) are known for targeting Christians and other religious minorities through kidnappings and killings. The presence of such militias as al-Hashd al-Sha'bi (Popular Mobilization Units loyal to Iran) are increasing insecurity and instability for all categories of Christian communities and are a dangerous source of violations against converts from Islam to Christianity. There are some forty different militias of various sizes (nominally) under the control of the central government, some of which are very radicalized. In the Nineveh Plains some 32,000 Christians are having to live in areas controlled by Iran-backed PMU. In 2020, Shia militias and IS stepped up attacks on civilians, security forces and infrastructure; Shia militias also attacked US assets in revenge for the killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020 (BBC News, 3 January 2020).

With the USA speeding up the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq due to the spread of COVID-19 and Iraqi security forces being moved to the cities to assist with COVID-19 response efforts and impose curfews, many Iraqis fear that their country will become "<u>a new battleground</u>" between Iran-backed militias and the Islamic State (Foreign Policy, 6 April 2020). Added to this are - for many Christians - ongoing land disputes and lack of access to their former homes, which has led to many Christians feeling they no longer have any future in the country. The youth in particular are increasingly hoping to emigrate to the West, arguing that the lack of career possibilities and physical and financial security does not leave them any choice but to live in exile.

The major player in the current situation in Iraqi Kurdistan however is <u>Turkey</u> (Al-Monitor, 22 July 2020). Turkey's incursions into northern Iraq to fight against the PKK add to the instability of northern Iraq and directly threatens the safety of Christians living in the area, causing many to flee. <u>Online media</u> reported in August 2019 that 10 Christian villages had to be evacuated because of repeated Turkish air raids (Assist News Services, 4 August 2019). On 20 and 21 June 2020, the area surrounding Zakho in Dohuk district of the Kurdistan Region was a main target. According to an interview with the regional Chaldean archbishop in a report published by Asia News on 22 June 2020, Christian villages were <u>bombed</u> by Turkish fighter planes, causing many Christians to flee and find refuge in houses and churches in Zakho. Five Kurdish civilians and a Turkish soldier were killed; there were some minor injuries among Christians as well. A Christian cemetery in Zakho was also hit.

As long as this combination of crises is not addressed and solved, Iraq will remain in a precarious situation. This is obviously to the detriment of all religious minorities and poses a threat to the very survival of the Church in Iraq.

Trends analysis

1) Sectarian violence and corruption are hampering progress and democracy

Iraq was only given national status early in the 20th century, but was built on the ancient powerful kingdoms of Babylonia and Assyria. The ethnically and religiously diverse nation is suffering from sectarian violence and corruption which are the main factors hampering progress and the process of democracy. Closely related is the problem of impunity, which greatly affects the position of Iraq's Christians, and the rise of radical Islamic groups which do not tolerate any other religion than a strict and violent form of Islam. Although the general situation in Iraq re-

mains far from stable, there are hopeful developments as IS was territorially defeated in December 2017, allowing many Christians to return to a number of villages. However, in 2020, IS and Shia militias stepped up their attacks on the population, security forces and infrastructure which is discouraging Christians from feeling at home and safe in Iraq.

2) The central government continues to be unable to guarantee the safe return of Christian IDPs

Many church leaders have said that living under the terror of IS and being driven away from their homes was the source of the most severe violations the Church in Iraq had experienced in recent times. Even during earlier waves of persecution, discrimination and intolerance, the Nineveh plains were never fully emptied of Christians as was the case starting in 2014. The defeat of IS should bring improvement to the situation of Christians in Iraq. However, only when Christian IDPs successfully return to their former home-towns and cities can any improvement in their situation take root. Land disputes make it very difficult for the majority of them to return to their homelands in the Nineveh plains. Iranian-backed militias, Kurds, Arabs and others continue to occupy or expropriate lands previously belonging to minorities in the Nineveh plains, in a competition to gain control of the once multi-ethnic region. Christians are in the weakest position because of their now small numbers and lack of external support.

The central government does little to ameliorate the situation and ignores pleas from community representatives. If the central government continues to be unable to guarantee the safe return of Christian IDPs, they may continue to face severe violations of their basic rights and leave Iraq. Many among the Christian youth in particular are prepared to leave if the opportunity arises due to the lack of security, future prospects and financial stability. Added to this are the attacks by Turkish forces in northern Iraq to drive away the PKK from its border with the KRG. This affects Christians as much as the Kurds targeted by the Turkish army. These attacks might not be singling out Christians but they serve as yet another destructive level of pressure on the community.

3) There is danger that the Christian situation may well become 'a secondary issue'

It is important to keep the spot-light on this new phase of state-building in Iraq. The danger is, now that IS is considered defeated, that the levels of pressure and violence targeting the Christian community will be ignored or dismissed as a secondary issue. As this dossier shows, religious freedom violations against Christians are rooted in many factors and it has not just been a product of radical Islamic attacks. Also, the demographic changes going on in the Nineveh plain are possibly an indication of more oppression to come in the future, especially if the government continues to be weak and impunity widespread.

External Links - Keys to understanding

- Link for general background information: Iraq country profile BBC News https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14542954
- Political and legal landscape: 2019 Democracy Index http://eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019
- Political and legal landscape: Iraqi Constitution of 2005 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en

- Political and legal landscape: major demonstrations https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/hundreds-gather-baghdad-anti-gov-protests-200510095037978.html
- Religious landscape description: World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/static/94a7ec6aa19b832baabc1948422fb9cf/IZ-summary.pdf
- Religious landscape description: Christmas as a national holiday https://edition.com/2018/12/25/world/iraq-christmas-holiday/index.html
- Economic landscape: UN Human Development Indicators http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ
- Economic landscape: World Bank's May 2020 update https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq
- Economic landscape: World Bank's Systematic Country Diagnostic http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/pdf/IRAQ-SCD-FINAL-cleared-02132017.pdf
- Economic landscape: Economist Intelligence Unit http://country.eiu.com/Iraq
- Social and cultural landscape: UNDP 2019 report http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf
- Social and cultural landscape: World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iraq/
- Social and cultural landscape: UN Global Human Development Indicators http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ
- Social and cultural landscape: pressure on Christian women https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2015/12/christian-women-in-baghdad-face-intimidation-to-veil/
- Social and cultural landscape: UNDP https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNDP_IQ_Impact_of_the_Oil_Crisis_and_COVID_19_o n_Iraq_Fragility.pdf
- Technological landscape: World Internet Stats https://www.internetworldstats.com/middle.htm#iq
- Technological landscape: World Bank's Country profile https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b45
 Ofd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=IRQ
- Technological landscape: Freedom on the Net Report 2019. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/11042019_Report_FH_FOTN_2019_final_Public_Download.pdf
- Technological landscape: 2019 Report on Freedom in the World https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2019/iraq
- Technological landscape: Reporters Without Borders (RSF) https://rsf.org/en/iraq
- Security situation: killing https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463
- Security situation: a new battleground https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/iraq-islamic-state-comebackcoronavirus-us-withdrawal/
- Security situation: Turkey https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/07/turkey-iraq-kurds-fear-pkkoperations-lead-turkish-presence.html
- Security situation: Online media https://www.assistnews.net/christian-villages-bombed-and-evacuated/
- Security situation: bombed http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Kurdish-bishop:-Christians-flee-Turkishbombing,-'our-fear-is-great'-50406.html

WWL 2021: Church information / Iraq

Christian origins

Christians have been living in the region since the earliest days of the Christian Church. According to tradition, the Christian faith was brought to Mesopotamia by the Apostle Thomas on his way to India. During the 1st century AD in Edessa (today Urfa in south-east Turkey) Syriac churches were established. This branch of Christianity spread in its Syriac linguistic and cultural form and became the Church of Iraq, especially after its formalization at the Council of Ctesiphon (south of Baghdad) in 410 AD. At that council, the Syriac churches met to adopt the Nestorian brand of Christianity. The Roman Empire and its churches had declared Nestorianism a heresy at the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD.

In the south, Arabic Christianity developed fast. The Arabic Kingdom of Hirah had a bishop in 410 AD. This Arabic bishop and a significant part of the population accepted the Nestorian faith, as did the last king, al-Nu'man (580-602 AD). Nestorians became the main Christian influence from the 5th century on until the Islamic invasions began in the 7th/8th century, crippling Church life.

According to Islamic sources, Muslim armies occupied the area of Iraq in 633 AD. About three centuries later, the Church had become a minority due to Islamization. The Mongol take-over of Iraq (1258) brought great freedom to the Nestorian Church. This only lasted until the Mongol ruler Ghazan Mahmud (1295-1304) became a Muslim. During these 50 years of freedom, Roman Catholics came in the early 14th century, when Rome sent Dominican and Franciscan friars to proselytize the Chaldeans, Eastern Orthodox and Muslims.

In 1552, Roman Catholic mission bore fruit when the abbot of a Nestorian monastery in northern Iraq visited Rome and was installed as a Catholic bishop. He installed five more bishops in northern Iraq, but in 1675 this Church returned to the Nestorian Church. In 1830, another effort by Rome would have more lasting impact; many Nestorians joined the Uniate Chaldean-Catholic Church.

Protestant missionaries, on the other hand, did not arrive until the 19th century. Missionary societies embracing the principles of William Carey first came to the country in 1815 (starting with the Anglican Church Missionary Society). Another Protestant mission in Iraq was was by the London Jewish Society in 1820. Presbyterian missionaries came to Iraq in 1836 and built a church in Mosul in 1840. Samuel Zwemer and his team of the Reformed Church in America entered Basra in 1889. However, in general, Protestant Christianity failed to get firmly established in Iraq.

By the beginning of the 20th century, an estimated 30% of the population of what is now Iraq was Christian. The original Nestorian Church in Iraq was strong in the north, with Erbil as its centre, but in World War I they lost over half of their members due to the Ottoman genocide when the Turkish regime murdered over 250,000 Christians. This meant that in some areas one-third of the Christian community had perished.

Under the League of Nations, the Mesopotamian region became a mandate of Great Britain, which united the three dominate regions (Mosul, Basra and Baghdad) into a single nation, known today as Iraq. Shortly after Britain granted Iraq its independence in 1932, the Christian population fell to less than 8%. The number of Christians in Iraq further decreased as a result of sectarian violence following the Gulf wars and the US-led invasion in the 1990s and beginning of the 21st century. By the time of the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, there were still over a million Christians in Iraq. Due to the civil war, and the brutal rule of IS in northern Iraq, those numbers have dwindled considerably.

Church spectrum today

| Iraq: Church networks | Christians | % |
|---|------------|-------|
| Orthodox | 60,000 | 34.3 |
| Catholic | 100,000 | 57.1 |
| Protestant | 10,000 | 5.7 |
| Independent | 70,000 | 40.0 |
| Unaffiliated | 5,000 | 2.9 |
| Doubly-affiliated Christians | -70,000 | -40.0 |
| Total | 175,000 | 100.0 |
| (Any deviation from the total number of Christians stated above is due to the rounding of decimals) | | |
| | | |
| Evangelical movement | 16,000 | 9.1 |
| Renewalist movement | 40,000 | 22.9 |

Data source: Johnson T M and Zurlo G A, eds., World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed February 2020)

Orthodox: Eastern (Chalcedonian), Oriental (Pre-Chalcedonian, Non-Chalcedonian, Monophysite), Nestorian (Assyrian), and non-historical Orthodox. Roman Catholics: All Christians in communion with the Church of Rome. Protestants: Christians in churches originating in or in communion with the Western world's 16th-century Protestant Reformation. Includes Anglicans, Lutherans and Baptists (any of whom may be Charismatic) and denominational Pentecostals, but not Independent traditions such as Independent Baptists nor independent Charismatics. Independents: Christians who do not identify with the major Christian traditions (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant). Unaffiliated Christians: Persons professing publicly to be Christians but who are not affiliated to churches. Doubly-affiliated Christians: Persons affiliated to or claimed by 2 denominations at once. Evangelical movement: Churches, denominations, and individuals who identify themselves as evangelicals by membership in denominations linked to evangelical alliances (e.g., World Evangelical Alliance) or by self-identification in polls. Renewalist movement: Church members involved in Pentecostal/Charismatic renewal.

According to the <u>2019 Report on International Religious Freedom</u>, the majority of Iraq's Christians are "Chaldean Catholics (an eastern rite of the Roman Catholic Church), and nearly 20 percent are members of the Assyrian Church of the East. The remainder are Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, and Anglican and other Protestants. There are approximately 2,000 registered members of evangelical Christian churches in the IKR, while an unknown number, mostly converts from Islam, practice the religion secretly."

Most Christians in Iraq are concentrated in the provinces of the Kurdistan Region (IKR). There is also a Christian concentration in Nineveh Province / Governorate. The Nineveh plains are among the so-called disputed areas between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Government of Iraq (GOI). After the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2017, most of

the plains of Nineveh came back under the control of the Iraqi government. Few or no Christians are left in Baghdad and only small numbers in Basra. Converts to Christianity can be found in all provinces of Iraq.

External Links - Church information

• Church spectrum today - additional information: 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iraq/

WWL 2021: Persecution Dynamics / Iraq

Reporting period

1 October 2019 - 30 September 2020

Position on the World Watch List

| Iraq: World Watch List | Points | WWL Rank |
|------------------------|--------|----------|
| WWL 2021 | 82 | 11 |
| WWL 2020 | 76 | 15 |
| WWL 2019 | 79 | 13 |
| WWL 2018 | 86 | 8 |
| WWL 2017 | 86 | 7 |

Scores and ranks are shown above whenever the country scored 41 points or more in the WWL 2017-2021 reporting periods

The score for Iraq went up from 76 points in WWL 2020 to 82 points in WWL 2021. The average score for pressure increased slightly by 0.1 point to a total of 14.2 points remaining at the same extreme level. However, the score for violence went up considerably, from 5.6 to 11.5 points, due to a high number of churches being closed, as well as an increase in the number of Christians abducted. During the WWL 2021 reporting period, there were also reports of several Christians being killed, physically or mentally harmed, threatened and sexually harassed. Although some Christian families have returned to their homes, the emigration of Christians is continuing due to the lack of security and lack of hope for a good future. There was also a higher reported number of Christians forced to relocate within the country. Many incidents, though not all, were related to the Turkish bomb attacks and ground invasion in northern Iraq in June 2020.

Persecution engines

| Iraq: Persecution engines | Abbreviation | Level of influence |
|---|--------------|--------------------|
| Islamic oppression | ю | Strong |
| Religious nationalism | RN | Not at all |
| Ethno-religious hostility | ERH | Not at all |
| Clan oppression | со | Strong |
| Christian Denominational protectionism | CDP | Medium |
| Communist and post-Communist oppression | СРСО | Not at all |
| Secular intolerance | SI | Not at all |
| Dictatorial paranoia | DPA | Strong |
| Organized corruption and crime | осс | Strong |

The scale for the level of influence of Persecution engines in society is: Not at all / Very weak / Weak / Medium / Strong / Very strong. For more information see WWL Methodology.

Islamic oppression (Strong)

Christians in Iraq experience *Islamic oppression* from Sunni and Shia Muslims irrespective of their ethnicity (Kurdish, Iranian, and Arab). Considering the high level of conservatism and strong collaboration of Sunni elements with Islamist insurgents, the line between who is an extremist and who is not, becomes blurry.

The influence of Islamic militants has made Islamic consciousness a new factor in the country, including in the IKR in the north. In the Iraqi and Kurdish governments, the role of Islam is increasing due to regional developments. Several Shia parties have close relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Christian converts with a Muslim background in particular have for some time reported being monitored by Iranian secret services in areas close to the Iranian border. In general, Iraqi society is becoming more Islamic: Islamic dogma and rhetoric rule daily life, and Islamic leaders (especially Shiites) continue to influence social, religious and political life. This is then reflected in social norms and practices that affect all people in Iraq and becomes a benchmark for non-Muslims as well. Social control of women is on the rise and even Christian women in Baghdad and Basra are forced to cover up in order to move around safely outside their homes.

Clan oppression (Strong)

Iraqi society is still very tribal, especially where areas have been disrupted by sectarian tensionsand violence (mostly in territory previously controlled by IS). Tribes in Iraq have a very strong influence and impose their age-old customs and traditions on society. Compliance with this is often more important than adherence to government law, as tribes are usually above the law. Where this tribalism is mixed with Islam, it will mainly affect Christians with a Muslim background. A convert's tribal background - especially where it concerns a prominent tribe - can cause problems for other Christians and keep them from giving support to the convert. In some areas, tribal groups have influence within (and sometimes even over) the government.

Organized corruption and crime (Strong)

Corruption is deeply rooted in Iraqi society, right up to the highest levels and plays an important role in the persecution of Christians in Iraq both in the area controlled by the Government of Iraq (GOI) and in the IKR. Drivers of this engine are specifically disadvantaging Christians in the areas of finding jobs and registering Christian companies but are also taking properties belonging to Christians. In many majority Islamic areas, Christians can often only sell their houses at 60% of the price. Other examples are: i) The seizure of land belonging to Christians; in the GOI area, at least 70% of properties left behind by Christians fleeing the country have been illegally seized by organized criminal groups, which include very influential politicians and religious leaders. Similar phenomena can be observed in the IKR, whereby the perpetrators are influential tribal leaders, affiliated with the ruling clan. The vulnerable position of religious minorities such as Christians is being exploited. ii) The killing and kidnapping of Christians; since 2003 this has occurred in waves, causing feelings of great insecurity. These two reasons are among the main causes for Iraqi Christian emigration and for the depletion of the Christian community in Iraq. The COVID-19 crisis has further exacerbated this state of chaos and corruption.

Dictatorial Paranoia (Strong)

This engine is blended with *Islamic oppression*. The aim of staying in power whatever the cost has been a key issue in central Iraqi government and is fed by the patronage system, corruption and nepotism. This focus leads to failure in supporting a pluralistic society in which Christians (and other minorities) would feel truly welcome. In the north there were reports in June 2018 of the Kurdish authorities confiscating 'Assyrian' land. Also, elements within the central government in Baghdad have attempted to arrange a longstanding, systematic campaign of demographic change of minority areas by facilitating land and housing for "Shia and Sunni Muslims to move into traditionally Christians areas", according to Christians in the region. Religious and political Christian leaders continue to renounce the fraudulent and forced appropriation of Christian-owned property. Finally, Christians in IKR have complained about the alleged exploitation of the electoral law in the 2018 parliamentary elections, when Kurdish and Shia Arab parties took the five quota seats reserved for Christian parties but by parties that did not give priority to issues that were important to Christian communities and were not politically loyal to them. This continued to be an issue raised by Christian leaders in 2020.

Christian denominational protectionism (Medium)

Christian denominational protectionism was weaker when IS still had a territorial presence in Iraq and churches of many different denominations were more inclined to cooperate with each other. In Iraq, there are fourteen Christian denominations recognized by the State, two of which are Protestant. If a new denomination applies for registration, the officially recognized churches are asked to approve the application. Often, they strongly object to registering non-traditional Protestant groups. Historical churches often try to prevent members of their congregations from visiting the newer church groups. Some traditional Catholic churches refuse to allow Protestant Christians to bury their dead in Catholic cemeteries. In southern and central regions of Iraq, Christian group can face threats and opposition from family members, tribal leaders and society around them. These threats include the risk of losing employment, inheritance or the means to marry. Bishops of Historical church communities have also be known to refuse to hold weddings for members who have been visiting Evangelical churches. Families and community can disassociate themselves from such cross-denominational converts.

| Iraq: Drivers of persecution per engine | Ю | RN | ERH | со | CDP | СРСО | SI | DPA | occ |
|--|----------------|----|-----|--------------|--------|------|----|--------------|--------|
| | STRONG | - | - | STRONG | MEDIUM | - | - | STRONG | STRONG |
| Government officials | Strong | - | - | Very weak | Weak | - | - | Strong | Strong |
| Ethnic group leaders | Strong | - | - | Strong | - | - | - | Strong | - |
| Non-Christian religious leaders | Strong | - | - | Medium | - | - | - | Weak | - |
| Religious leaders of other churches | - | - | - | Weak | Strong | - | - | Very weak | - |
| Violent religious groups | Very strong | - | - | Very weak | - | - | - | Strong | Strong |
| Ideological pressure groups | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Citizens (people from the broader society), including mobs | Strong | - | - | Weak | Weak | - | - | Strong | Medium |
| One's own (extended) family | Very strong | - | - | Strong | Medium | - | - | - | - |
| Political parties | Strong | - | - | Medium | - | - | - | Strong | Medium |
| Revolutionaries or paramilitary groups | Strong | - | - | Strong | - | - | - | Strong | Weak |

Drivers of persecution

| Iraq: Drivers of persecution per engine | ю | RN | ERH | со | CDP | СРСО | SI | DPA | осс |
|---|--------------|----|-----|--------|--------|------|----|--------|--------|
| | STRONG | - | - | STRONG | MEDIUM | - | - | STRONG | STRONG |
| Organized crime cartels or networks | Medium | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Strong |
| Multilateral organizations (e.g. UN, OIC, embassies etc.) | Very weak | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

The scale for the level of influence of Drivers of persecution in society is: Not at all / Very weak / Weak / Medium / Strong / Very strong. Please note that "-" denotes "not at all". For more information see WWL Methodology.

Drivers of Islamic oppression

- Violent religious groups (Very strong): Violent religious groups such as Islamic State (IS) and Shia militants are known to target Christians for kidnapping and murder. Today, whereas IS is still actively present in the areas of Khanaqin, Kirkuk and Mosul where they persecute other minorities, Shia militias are one of the greatest sources of persecution against Christians. Militias have been known to expropriate Christians' land for years. Some militias are a particularly dangerous source of serious religious freedom violations against converts. (See "Security Situation" above). Examples of Shia militias (mostly affiliated with Iran and linked to Iraqi political parties) are: The Badr Corps, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades, the Mahdi Army, the Army of The Mukhtar, the Brigade of Abi Fadl al-Abbas, Badr Affiliate of Iran (considered a terrorist group by the USA) and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.
- **Extended family (Very strong):** Relatives are known to put severe pressure on Christians with a Muslim background to get them to return to Islam, and this sometimes includes attempts to kill them. Converts can face physical harm and torture, detention, being disowned and expelled from the family home, being ostracized from clan, family and community, forced divorce (especially targeting women), forced marriage with a radical Muslim (especially targeting women) and loss of custody of children.
- Government officials (Strong): Some government officials are said to have tried to
 encourage demographic change by offering land and housing to Shia and Sunni Muslims in
 the historically Christian areas of the Nineveh Plain, such as Bartalla District Judge, Sunni
 areas in Diyala province, and Sunni areas in Babil province, including Jurf al-Sakhar district.
 Local authorities in some regions continued to verbally harass and restrict religious
 activities, according to representatives of minority religious communities. (source: 2019
 International Religious Freedom Report). Government officials have been responsible for
 anti-Christian poster campaigns, e.g. telling Muslims to boycott Christmas festivals, not to
 wish Christians well at Christmas and not to use Christmas decorations; or (fixed to church
 buildings in the GOI area) telling Christian women to wear the hijab. Government officials
 who belong to radical Islamic groups can make it very difficult for Christians to complete all
 necessary paper work. Considering the high level of conservatism and strong collaboration

of Sunni elements with Islamist insurgents, the line between who is radical and who is not becomes blurred. Government officials are known to have arrested Christians with an Islamic background and have been involved in violent incidents against them.

- *Ethnic leaders (Strong):* If the new faith of converts from Islam to Christianity becomes known, ethnic leaders are very likely to put strong pressure on them to renounce their new faith. Some tribal elders have agreed to converts being killed. Finally there were reports of serious pressure by Yezidi leaders against converts to Christianity.
- Political parties (Strong): In the parliamentary elections of May 2018, a Shia political group and Kurdish parties manipulated the election to deprive Christians of their five 'quota seats'. In the past, some Shia political parties proposed laws, which discriminate against Christians, i.e. the new national ID law. This law stipulates that the children of a spouse who converts to Islam, will be automatically considered Muslim. Apart form Islamic political parties, also ethnic, paramilitary and tribal groups have at times formed parties that have had exclusivist agendas. Most of the Shiite militias mentioned above are connected to political parties or more specifically political leaders, such as Muqtada al-Sadr. Reportedly, Nouri al-Maliki, Vice President of Iraq from 2016 to 2018 and secretary-general of the Islamic Dawa party, is a great supporter of armed Shiite groups.
- Non-Christian religious leaders (Strong): Another source of persecution, discrimination and intolerance are radical Islamic leaders, both Shia and Sunni, who directly influence politics and other aspects of life in Iraq. Their influence is reflected in: i) discriminating policies, laws and administration practices against Christians, and ii) the very common use of hate-speech by Muslim leaders alienating Christians.
- Normal citizens (Strong): In the highly conservative Iraqi society, many Muslims view Christians as infidels and sometimes as crusaders or as part of a "Western plan". In this context, the evangelical community is sometimes viewed as being implementers of a Zionist program. Christians of a Muslim background tend to be seen as unbelievers who deserve death for leaving Islam. Speeches by Islamic radicals in the Kurdistan region of Iraq have sometimes led to protests or mobs destroying shops which sell alcohol and churches. Shops selling alcohol in Baghdad are also sometimes targeted. Since Muslims are not allowed to drink alcohol (according to their religious laws), the owners of these shops are often Christians or Yazidis. In previous years, citizens collaborated with IS or became part of militias that persecuted Christians for instance in Mosul. This has greatly harmed the levels of trust Christians now have for neighbors and others in their communities. Normal citizens in all areas of Iraq have also put pressure on Christians with a Muslim background to make them return to Islam.
- **Organized crime cartels or networks (Medium):** Apart from political parties and some militia groups, criminal networks have also been involved in the confiscation of more than 30,000 Christian properties in Baghdad and other areas. This has taken place with impunity in spite of commitments by the Prime Minister's office to launch inquiries into the seizures

(Source: International Religious Freedom Report 2018). Mafia-like groups are joining forces with real estate offices and confiscating Christian-owned properties by falsifying documents with relative impunity. In some cases, the Christian owners or tenants were threatened directly, which made them leave their homes.

Drivers of Clan oppression

- Extended family (Strong), Ethnic leaders (Strong) and non-Christian religious leaders (Medium): Clan oppression concerns the imposition of age-old norms and values shaped in 'tribal' context and is often blended with *Islamic oppression*. Belonging to and obeying a tribe is commonly seen as being more important than 'obeying' the law. Drivers of this engine are particularly families of converts and tribal, ethnic or Islamic leaders.
- **Political parties (Medium):** Iraqi political parties in general have contributed to reviving and strengthening tribalism in various ways. In some areas there are clans whose impact exceeds the influence of a particular party. If someone who violates another's rights belongs to this clan, no one can do anything to assert justice. In these cases, where the perpetrator belongs to the ruling group, Christians are a soft and easy target. Ethnic and tribal groups have at times formed parties that have had exclusivist agendas. Tribal pressures can especially affect converts to Christianity: If a convert's tribal background is known, this can seriously discourage other Christians from helping him or her due to the influence tribal groups have even at government level.

Drivers of Dictatorial paranoia

• **Political parties, government officials and normal citizens (Strong):** Government officials at all levels are reported to threaten Christians and "encourage" them to emigrate. Also, normal citizens in the north have reportedly made remarks in public, questioning why Christians are still in Iraq. By failing to promote a pluralistic society, political parties also contribute to freedom of religion violations of Christians. Christians in IKR have complained about the alleged exploitation of the electoral law in the 2018 parliamentary elections, when Kurdish and Shia parties took the quota seats reserved for Christians on the National Council and put forward their own Christian candidates.

Religious, ethnic, paramilitary, and tribal groups have at times formed parties that have had exclusivist agendas. The same holds true for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU), an Iraqi umbrella organization funded by the state, comprising some 40 militias, mainly Shia Muslim groups, but also Sunni Muslim, Christian and Yazidi groups, some of which form political arms to their military groups. Shiite and Sunni political parties are the biggest threat to Christians, whereas the pressure coming from nationalist parties (e.g. Kurdish) is lower. Sources said some government officials were trying to bring about demographic change by providing land and housing for Shia and Sunni Muslims to relocate to traditionally Christian areas in the Nineveh Plain region, Sunni areas in Diyala Province, and Sunni areas in Babil Province.

According to a source in the region, prominent members of Kurdish parties or persons loyal to them have been responsible for stealing money, property, land and factories belonging to Christians in Iraqi Kurdistan. The relationship between Kurds and Assyrians is ambivalent. In some cases Assyrian nationalists say that Kurdish parties are trying to dominate their villages and region. But at the same time, Kurds have supported Christians, for instance by allowing new churches to be established.

• Violent religious groups, ethnic leaders (Strong) and revolutionaries or paramilitary groups (Strong): Other drivers that will do anything to strengthen their power are ethnic group leaders (e.g. Kurdish leaders) ethnic militias (e.g. the Shabak) and violent religious groups like IS, al-Qaeda and Khorazan. For example, Shabak and other minority groups have prevented Christians from returning to their villages and have de facto expropriated them in many places.

Drivers of Christian denominational protectionism

- Religious leaders of other churches (Strong): At a lower level of pressure, leaders of Historic churches have sometimes thwarted the official recognition of new Christian denominations. In one case, a Catholic leader used his influence to motivate the police to harass a Protestant pastor who was active in a traditionally Catholic village. The pastor and his team were detained on false accusations and the pastor was forced to leave the village. Some Catholic churches in IKR prevent Protestant Christians from burying their dead in Christian cemeteries. In Baghdad, Protestant denominations which are not (yet) recognized by the central government, have to make a payment to be able to bury their dead. The land is provided by the State and the cemetery is administered by the one Protestant denomination in Baghdad. In the IKR government, the Department for Christian Affairs is dominated by the Chaldean (Catholic) Church which influences and hinders some administrative
- **Extended family (Medium):** Family members who change church affiliation often this concerns leaving a historical church denomination for a newer, non-traditional one are often frowned upon by other family members. Pressure is likely to be exerted to stimulate return to the traditional church.

Drivers of Organized corruption and crime

 Violent religious groups, political parties, government officials, organized crime cartels or networks (Strong): Violent religious groups, government officials and criminal groups have been involved in corruption and crime to exploit Christians. Government officials connected to criminal groups take advantage of their authority and falsify documents. Criminal groups link up with real estate offices and commit fraud to get hold of Christian-owned properties - mostly belonging to Christians who have fled. This has been going on for years and is still continuing in Baghdad. Members of military forces are also known to have stolen factories that belonged to Christians in the south of Kirkuk Province. Even in the north of Iraq, most often cases of Christian property theft remain unresolved and without restoration of the rights of the owners. In central and southern Iraq, Christians are exposed to the threats of armed groups who force them to leave their country and flee for their lives.

Other examples are Tel Kefe and Bartella in Nineveh Plain. The former is completely free of Christians (despite being a fully Christian city until 2014) and the latter has become majority Shabak (Shia) despite being a predominantly Christian before IS came. In both cases, militias created facts on the ground and maintained their position through the monopoly of violence.

Minorities regularly complain about this situation and the impunity of "the occupiers". Yazidis, Christians, and local and international NGOs reported that members of the People's Mobilization Force (PMF) continued to engage in verbal harassment and physical abuse, at checkpoints as well as in the cities and surrounding areas which are controlled by PMF on the Nineveh Plain. According to Christians in the region, the PMF dominated Nineveh Plain's trade routes, forced merchants to pay bribes and controlled real estate in Christian areas" (2019 International Religious Freedom Report). In general drivers of this engine are mostly people in or close to political power and Shia militia backed by Iran. The kidnapping of Christians - which has decreased - also often comes in the form of organized crime, having both financial and religious motives.

- Political parties (Medium): Apart from criminal networks and some militia groups, political
 parties were also involved in the seizure of more than 30,000 Christian properties in
 Baghdad and other areas, in defiance of promises by the prime minister's office to
 investigate the appropriations.
- Normal citizens (Medium): Some citizens have become complicit in this process of appropriation of Christian properties by buying and moving into them. Individuals have also confiscated land from Christian villages and started building on it, despite the fact that the Christians have official papers which prove they are the owners. This is happening in various cities in Iraqi Kurdistan, including Nineveh Plain, as well as in Baghdad and Mosul. Finally, Christians and other non-Muslims have reported corruption, nepotism and uneven application of the rule of law in employment which negatively affected the economic situation of non-Muslim communities and was one of the reasons for them to emigrate.
- **Ethnic leaders:** Kurdish landowners have also illegally expropriated land, farms and other properties belonging to many Christian families in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in recent years. The illegal expropriations were carried out by Kurdish countrymen, who operated separately or in coordination with other members of the tribe. This includes a clan that is known for taking the land of Christians by force.

Areas where Christians face most difficulties

Most Christians in Iraq live in the north of the country, in Kurdistan, especially in the following provinces: Nineveh Plain, Arbil, As-Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk and At-Ta'mim. Few Christians are left in Baghdad and Basra. The situation is particularly difficult for Christians in the south and center

of the country. Christians have left most of the provinces there, with the exception of small groups of converts with a Muslim background.

Violations against converts - particularly in the form of *Islamic* and *Clan oppression* - tend to be stronger in Arab than Kurdish areas. In general, the atmosphere in Kurdish areas is more tolerant of dissenters.

Christian communities and how they are affected


Communities of expatriate Christians: Expatriate Christians have not been counted as a separate category according to WWL Methodology as they do not usually function as an involuntarily isolated group in Iraq.

Historical Christian communities: Churches such as the Assyrian Orthodox Church, the Chaldean Catholic or Syrian Catholic Church and the Armenian Church are all seriously affected by violations from radical Islamic movements and non-Christian religious leaders. They also face discrimination from government authorities. In central and southern Iraq, Christians often do not publicly display Christian symbols like a cross as this can lead to harassment or discrimination at check-points, university, work-place or government buildings. Most of the Christians in the IKR usually portray Christian symbols without any problems, although in rare cases some have reportedly removed the crosses from their cars so as not to attract unwanted attention.

Converts: This category consists of Christians from a Muslim background or crossdenominational converts from a Historical Christian community background who now worship with non-traditional Christian communities. Converts from Islam experience most pressure from (extended) family and often keep their new faith a secret as they risk being threatened by their family members, tribal leaders and society around them. Changing church (e.g. from an Orthodox to an Evangelical congregation) is also often punished by refusing rights or losing employment. A bishop refused to perform marriages for members of his Orthodox church who had been attending Evangelical churches.

Non-traditional Christian communities: Evangelical, Baptist and Pentecostal churches in Bagdad and Basra, are also seriously affected by violations from radical Islamic movements and non-Christian leaders, including discrimination from the authorities. To some extent, Evangelical Christians are also affected by opposition from (extended) family. Outspoken Christians have regularly become targets in central and southern Iraq. Blasphemy laws can be used against them too if they are suspected of carrying out outreach among Muslims. For Evangelicals there is no legal framework for setting up a Bible school or for recruiting and registering organizations from the outside to support them in this.

The Persecution pattern



WWL 2021 Persecution Pattern for Iraq

The WWL 2021 Persecution pattern for Iraq shows:

- The average pressure on Christians in Iraq continues to score at an extreme level (14.2 points), almost the same (0.1 point difference) as in the WWL 2020 reporting period. Extreme levels of pressure are recorded in every *sphere of life*, except for *Private life* where the level is 'very high' and almost 'extreme' with a score of 13.6 points. This is typical for a situation in which there are many different persecution engines operating.
- Pressure from *Islamic oppression* affects all five *spheres of life* especially for converts. *Clan oppression* (blended with *Islamic oppression*) is most prevalent in the *Family* and *Private spheres of life*. *Organized corruption and crime* is mostly reflected in the *Community* and *National spheres of life*. *Christian denominational protectionism* particularly affects the *Church, Family* and *Private spheres of life*.
- The level of violence against Christians increased from very high (5.6 points) in WWL 2020 to extreme levels in WWL2 021: 11.5 points, an increase of 5.9 points. The increase is mainly explained by a much higher number of churches being closed, as well as an increase in the number of Christians abducted.

Pressure in the 5 spheres of life

In each of the five spheres of life discussed below, four questions have been selected from the WWL 2021 questionnaire for brief commentary and explanation. The selection usually (but not always) reflects the highest scoring elements. In some cases, an additional paragraph per sphere is included to give further information deemed important. (To see how individual questions are scored on a scale of 0-4 points, please see the "WWL Scoring example" in the WWL Methodo-

logy, available at: http://opendoorsanalytical.org/world-watch-list-documentation/, password: freedom).

Pressure in Block 1 / Private sphere

Block 1.8: It has been risky for Christians to speak about their faith with those other than immediate family (extended family, others). (3.75 points)

For converts from Islam, it is very risky to discuss their faith with extended family and others. Historical churches had experienced in the course of the centuries that they could not engage in discussions about faith outside their community or any activity that could be considered evangelization. For other Christian communities, talking to non-Christians about their faith always comes with the risk of alleged prosyletization and subsequent harassment and possible violence.

Block 1.5: It has been risky for Christians to display Christian images or symbols. (3.50 points)

In a country heavily affected by sectarian violence (and even genocide in the past), the display of religious symbols comes with the risk of harassment, abduction and violence. This holds especially true for central and south Iraq, but also in some parts of the Nineveh Plains such as Mosul. Indigenous Christians (not converts) wear and display Christian symbols and images in their private and public life except where they are living in very conservative Islamic communities. For converts from Islam, this would reveal their faith and is therefore very risky in the entire country, both in public and private life.

Block 1.1: Conversion has been opposed, forbidden, or punishable, including conversion from one type of Christianity to another. (3.25 points)

Iraqi law does not allow a Muslim to convert to another faith. As such, it is not possible for a former Muslim to change religion on identity cards. The convert will therefore still be officially registered as a Muslim (which would also apply to any children of the convert). Aside from significant social pressure, the greatest pressure comes from the convert's family which may issue death threats, place them under house arrest and carry out beatings, and other violence. Many have had to flee as a result. That is why many Christians with a Muslim background keep their faith secret.

Block 1.9: It has been risky for Christians to meet with other Christians. (3.25 points)

It is especially risky for converts from Islam to meet with other Christians as this could lead to their new faith being revealed. This is true for the entire country with levels of tension depending on where converts live. In more tolerant IKR and homogenous Christian villages in the Nineveh plains this would be less risky than in very conservative Islamic areas.

Of all Christians, it is converts who are the most restricted in their personal practice of faith. Converts cannot talk about their faith or possess Christian materials in a Muslim environment because they would face hostility and violence. In addition to being an 'apostate', talking about the Christian faith is viewed as an active act of proselytism and treason. Pressure in this sphere of life was particularly high in central and southern Iraq and a lesser extent in the IKR.

Pressure in Block 2 / Family sphere

Block 2.12: Christian spouses of non-Christians have been excluded from the right or opportunity to claim custody of the children in divorce cases. (3.75 points)

Under Iraqi family law, which is based on Sharia law, custody of children generally goes to the Muslim parent. Children of converts are considered to be Muslims and, according to Sharia, a non-Muslim parent cannot raise a Muslim child. If the husband is a Christian, he will be asked to give custody to the mother so that the children can be raised in accordance with Islamic law. If the mother is a Christian, she may also be allowed to take custody up to a certain age, but it is most likely that custody of the children will go to the Muslim parent, as most of the judges are Muslim.

Block 2.1: Babies and children of Christians have automatically been registered under the state or majority religion. (3.50 points)

According to Article 26 of the 2015 National Identity Card Law, children under 18 with one Muslim parent will be registered as Muslim, even if the non-Muslim mother was raped by a Muslim man and the child is the result of sexual assault. Once registered as Muslim, they cannot change their religion back to Christian. In some cases, this has led to the emigration of converts from Islam and other Christians. Christians with an Islamic background face the same issue, since they cannot change their religion, their children will automatically be registered as Muslim.

Block 2.2: Registering the birth, wedding, death, etc. of Christians has been hindered or made impossible. (3.50 points)

This is impossible for Christians with an Islamic background, since the authorities will continue to consider them Muslim. As a result, the marriage of a former Muslim to a non-Muslim will not be recognized. Their children will be treated as Muslims in all aspects of their legal and social life. This issue has been exacerbated by those who were forced to convert to Islam by IS militants, including Christians who are now considered Muslims, because they had to appear in front of a court to declare their conversion to Islam. Finally, unregistered non-traditional Christian communities are not able to register weddings or deaths of their members.

Block 2.8: Christian children have been pressured into attending anti-Christian or majority religion teaching at any level of education. (3.50 points)

This is especially true for children whose parents have an Islamic background since they are considered Muslims and will be obliged to attend Islamic religious classes at all levels of education. To a lesser extent this can also affect indigenous Christians, particularly in majority Islamic areas under the Iraqi central government and in very conservative Islamic environments (e.g. Mosul). Pressure either from teachers or fellow students can play a considerable role here. In the entire country, by law, all schools (including Christian based ones) are required to hold regular Islamic classes and exams. Failing these exams means failing to move up in grades. Also, the national curriculum is geared towards Islam - this goes beyond Religious Education and influences, for instance, lessons on history.

Converts from Islam often have to hide their Christian faith from their Islamic families due to the shame this brings to the family. They run the risk of otherwise being threatened and abandoned. Though under less pressure than converts, Christian families from other categories of Christians are restricted in several ways. In central and south Iraq, children of Christian families who attend state schools are often discriminated against. Apart from getting lower grades than Muslim children, they are required to attend Quran lessons and are not allowed to explain their faith even when asked. Christian parents are careful what they share about their faith with their children. If the children were to talk about their faith in school – especially during Islamic classes - the family could face accusations of blasphemy. Christian children who refuse to attend Islamic classes are often bullied and pressured into becoming Muslims. Also, Islamic dress can be forced on Christians in school. Some Christian girls have had to wear a head scarf at the university of Mosul. Converts were forced to either register their child as a Muslim or "have the child remain undocumented, affecting their <u>eligibility for government benefits</u>", as the US State Department mentions in its International Report on Religious Freedom for 2018.

Pressure in Block 3 / Community sphere

Block 3.1: Christians have been harassed, threatened or obstructed in their daily lives for faithrelated reasons (e.g. for not meeting majority religion or traditional dress codes, beard codes etc.). (3.50 points)

Discrimination of Christians is pervasive in Iraq. The lack of accountability through the civil war and numerous militias that are not controlled by the central government leave persecutors unpunished. Discrimination takes place on a daily basis in Iraq, even in the IKR. Discrimination based on dress codes, crosses in cars etc. is commonplace. Christian women of all Christian communities are put under pressure to wear a head covering in Baghdad and Basra. Even in the north of the country (Dohuk, Zakho and some areas of Erbil) there is a growing social pressure on Christian women to wear a head scarf. Additionally, the curriculum for elementary school students contains elements with inaccurate and offensive statements that incite hatred and division; Christian women are particularly affected by statements such as unveiled women being described as 'sick'.

Block 3.3: Christians have been under threat of abduction and/or forced marriage. (3.50 points)

Christian women from an Islamic background risk their lives if their new faith is known and they could be forced to marry a Muslim. There is a widespread fear of rape and other forms of violence among women from all Christian communities which could lead them to be married to the rapist, a situation which is supported by law: Rape in Iraq is not prosecuted if the rapist marries the women he violated, in order to restore the family honor. As such, women, including Christians, could be forced to marry their attacker.

Block 3.9: Christians have faced disadvantages in their education at any level for faith-related reasons (e.g. restrictions of access to education). (3.50 points)

The main disadvantage which Christians face in education is the Islamic focus of the religious education syllabus and the overall disregard of the contribution of 'other' communities to the

history of Iraq. This engenders a mentality of Christians being subordinate to Muslims and causes Christians and other non-Muslim communities not to be considered an inherent, indigenous part of Iraq's history and culture. Some of the official teaching materials, in governmental schools and universities, even define Christians as infidels and enemies and incite *jihad* against them. Also, there are reportedly few Christians obtaining scholarships or higher positions within the education system and universities. Christian students have complained that some Muslim university professors (intentionally) set exams during Christian festivals (Christmas and Easter). Finally, Assyrian schools have indicated that they face neglect and discrimination, not receiving the full funding they are entitled to or the textbooks they need.

Block 3.10: Christians have been discriminated against in public or private employment for faith-related reasons. (3.50 points)

Since a person's religion is stated on their ID card, it is easy to discriminate against Christians in the public sector. Christians, even those who are highly qualified, are not getting equal opportunities for employment or reaching higher positions. Although Christians hold senior positions in the national parliament and central government, they feel generally underrepresented in government appointments and elected positions and particularly in public sector jobs (especially at provincial and local levels) which limits minorities' access to governmentprovided economic opportunities. For Christians from an Islamic background this is even worse: They are likely to lose their job as soon as their new faith gets known (for instance, by not fasting during Ramadan). In such cases, they will not receive any official documentation or letter of recommendation, thus making it very hard for them to find another position, especially with larger firms.

Pressure in Block 4 / National sphere

Block 4.1: The Constitution (or comparable national or state law) limits freedom of religion as formulated in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (4.00 points)

Although the Constitution acknowledges basic human rights and religious freedoms and Iraq is a signatory of all treaties and agreements relating to human rights, a number of laws go against the principles which guarantee the religious freedom of Christians. For instance: The constitutional acknowledgment that Iraq is an Islamic country and that no laws can be issued which are contrary to Islam or Islamic principles. Iraqi laws allow conversion from other faiths to Islam, but it does not allow, neither recognizes, the conversion from Islam to other religions or beliefs. The ID law stipulates that if a person converts to Islam, all his/her children are considered Muslims, including his/her children from earlier marriages. According to personalstatus law, in a marriage where one of the spouses is a Muslim, the right of divorce, child-custody and inheritance goes almost automatically to the Muslim party.

Block 4.6: Christians have been barred from public office, or has promotion been hindered for faith-related reasons. (3.75 points)

Representatives of Christians communities regularly complain that they are under-represented in the public sector, particularly at provincial and local levels. Christians in IKR have complained about the alleged exploitation of the electoral law in the 2018 parliamentary elections, when Kurdish and Shiite parties took the quota seats reserved for Christians on the National Council and put forward their own Christian candidates. Generally speaking, as in most of the rest of the Middle East, Christians are not allowed to reach the highest ranks in certain institutions, such as the armed forces. Sometimes Christians have been challenged to become Muslim in order to receive promotion.

Block 4.14: Those who caused harm to Christians have deliberately been left unpunished. (3.75 points)

Most of the perpetrators of crimes against Christians are not held accountable. Christians from an Islamic background are even more vulnerable in this respect, especially where it concerns "honor crimes" by family. The central government does not exert control over militias, particularly in the Nineveh Plains. Cases of expropriation, destruction, abduction and murder in the IS and post-IS period have not been prosecuted. In spite of the great number of Christian homes and Christian property being seized (official figures estimate that this is the case for 78% of all properties belonging to Christians who left the country), the number of those who have been brought to justice is nominal.

Block 4.15: Christians accused in court have been deprived of equal treatment. (3.75 points)

Christians face the same degree of discrimination in Iraqi courts as they do in public life and politics. They risk being treated as second class citizens, unless they have personal contact to people in high levels of government.

Block 4.11: Christians have been subjected to smear campaigns or hate speech. (3.50 points)

According to sources in Iraq, non-Christian religious leaders regularly incite their followers against Christians for instance through sermons in mosques throughout Iraq. This can also directly lead to violence against Christians. Christians have also been regularly subjected to hate-speech and smear campaigns on national TV stations and online by radical Islamic groups.

Pressure in Block 5 / Church sphere

Block 5.7: Churches have been hindered from openly integrating converts. (4.00 points)

It would not be possible to integrate Christians with an Islamic background in a church located in the town or city where the converts originate from. Most of the time, converts have to leave their home-town for security reasons and find Christians in the anonymity of a large city - or leave the country for good. If it is known that a church integrates converts, it will become a target and might be closed. (The exception is in the IKR where some Kurdish churches have been able to integrate fellow Kurds. Regardless of the relatively greater freedom in the IKR, they are still closely watched and potentially at risk.)

Block 5.20: It has been risky for churches or Christian organizations to speak out against instigators of persecution. (4.00 points)

It is generally difficult for churches or Christian organizations to speak out publicly against those who persecute Christians, except when this concerns crimes committed by IS. In Iraq, instigators

of major acts of persecution are usually high-ranking religious and political leaders with considerable influence and military power. Christian leaders are very careful in how they formulate criticism and accusations. Christian leaders who have been more vocal in this respect have received threats to remain silent. Some people who have criticized the government, its militias or its political parties have been killed.

Block 5.1: Church activities have been monitored, hindered, disturbed, or obstructed. (3.50 points)

Known activities of fellowships composed of Christians with an Islamic background would most certainly be monitored, hindered and disrupted - though there are some minor exceptions in the IKR. Regardless of the relatively greater freedom in the IKR, converts are still closely watched. Christian life in parts of the Nineveh Plains has more or less died out: Mosul, Tel Kefe and other places were once home to vibrant Christian communities, but this is no longer the case. The vast majority of churches are still in ruins and government support to rebuild the Christian presence in the Nineveh Plains is lacking. Several churches are reportedly being monitored, especially those belonging to the newer, non-traditional Christian denominations.

Block 5.6: Work among youth in particular has been restricted. (3.50 points)

Youth work is only allowed inside church buildings; also, youth camps and other events can only take place inside the walls of a church compound and are not permitted outside. Church youth work can only be focused on Christian youth; no youth work is possible among the majority Muslim population. Unauthorized Christian communities that meet in a house or shop may face problems from the local police as a result of social pressure and Muslim neighbors who do not want to have these gatherings near their homes.

Violence

Violence is defined in WWL Methodology as the deprivation of physical freedom or as bodily harm to Christians or damage to their property. It includes severe threats (mental abuse). The table is based on reported cases as much as possible. Since many incidents go unreported, the numbers below must be understood as being minimum figures. In cases where it has been impossible to count exactly, a symbolic round figure (10, 100 or 1000) is given. (A symbolic number of 10 could in reality even be 100 or more but the real number is uncertain. A symbolic number of 100 could go well over 1000 but the real number is uncertain. A symbolic number of 1000 could go well over 10,000 but, again, the real number is uncertain.) In cases where it is clear that (many) more Christians are affected, but a concrete number could be given according to the number of incidents reported, the number given has to be understood as being an absolutely minimum figure. The symbol "x" denotes a known number which cannot be published due to security considerations.

| Irac | : Violence Block question | WWL 2021 | WWL 2020 |
|------|---|-------------|-------------|
| 6.1 | How many Christians have been killed for faith-related reasons (including state sanctioned executions)? | 3 | 3 |
| 6.2 | How many churches or Christian buildings (schools, hospitals, cemeteries, etc.) have been attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down, closed or confiscated for faith-related reasons? | 11 | 1 |
| 6.3 | How many Christians have been detained for faith-related reasons? | 6 | 3 |
| 6.4 | How many Christians have been sentenced to jail, labor camp, sent to psychiatric hospital as punishment, or similar things for faith-related reasons? | 0 | 0 |
| 6.5 | How many Christians have been abducted for faith-related reasons (including Christians missing in a persecution context)? | 4 | 0 |
| 6.6 | How many Christians have been raped or otherwise sexually harassed for faith-related reasons? | 10 | 10 |
| 6.7 | How many cases have there been of forced marriages of Christians to non-Christians? | 2 | 1 |
| 6.8 | How many Christians have been otherwise physically or mentally abused for faith-related reasons (including beatings and death threats)? | 10 | 13 |
| 6.9 | How many houses of Christians or other property (excluding shops) have been attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down or confiscated for faith-related reasons? | 100 | 10 |
| 6.10 | How many shops or businesses of Christians have been attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down, closed or confiscated for faith-related reasons? | 2 | 1 |
| 6.11 | How many Christians have been forced to leave their homes or go into hiding in-country for faith-related reasons? | 200 | 3 |
| 6.12 | How many Christians have been forced to leave the country for faith- related reasons? | 100 | 10 |

Disclaimer: In the chaotic circumstances of (civil) war it is often not clear whether incidents are religiously motivated or not. Incidents where Christians were harmed or Christian owned property was damaged in fighting between government and rebel forces which could be considered "collateral damage" were generally not included. Motives for attacks are mixed and include power mechanisms. However, this does not necessarily rule out anti-Christian motivation. For WWL analysis, cases have only been included i) where it was clear to perpetra-

tors in advance that Christian civilians would be affected (e.g. where a majority Christian town was attacked); and ii) where the local Christian community believed that those responsible were acting out of specific anti-Christian motivation through their adherence to anti-Christian ideology (for instance Islamic State (IS) or other violent Islamic militants).

In the case of the Turkish military offensive in the north of Iraq, the following considerations apply: It was known in advance that predominantly Christian villages were being targeted. Turkey claimed to be attacking PKK militants, but according to Christians in the region, there were none in their area. Also, there is an element of Islamist ideology: Referring to Turkey's military operation in the region, <u>Erdogan stated in a speech in August 2020</u> that the "Turkish army of Islam" is not occupying areas but "bringing justice of Allah" and taking what is their right in the area since their civilization is "one of conquest" (Memri TV, 26 August 2020). Finally there is a strong sense among the affected Christian population in the area, of whom many are descendants of those who escaped the Turkish genocide of 1915, that they are once again the target of a full-scale attack on their community.

- **Christians killed:** There were reports that two Christians of Muslim background were killed. For security reasons no details can be given. A third Christian was murdered at a jewelry store in Baghdad. (For details, see: "Specific examples of violations of rights of Christians in the reporting period" above.)
- *Churches and Christian buildings attacked or closed:* At least 10 churches were closed after predominantly Christian villages were vacated as a result of the Turkish attacks in the north. In reality, the total of churches closed for this reason is likely to be higher.
- **Christians arrested**: At least six Christians were detained without accusation and released later. For security reasons no further details can be given.
- *Christians abducted*: (For details, see: "Specific examples of violations of rights of Christians in the reporting period" above.)
- Christian homes and properties attacked or confiscated: This mostly concerns land grabbing by Shia militias as well as the bombing of Christian villages by Turkish forces. In Nahla Valley, a northern Iraqi region home to ethnic Assyrians, a court decision paved way for the expropriation of the land and buildings of 117 Christian families in July 2020. The Chaldean, Syrian and Assyrian Christian families were illegally expropriated by Kurdish landowners over the last few years. A previous court decision to retain their rights to the property was overturned.
- **Christians forced to leave their homes**: More than 200 Christians were displaced from their villages and homes in Zakho, due to the Turkish military operation in the region. Finally, there were also several Christians with an Muslim background who had to leave their houses and went into hiding because of their faith.

5 Year trends


The following three charts show the levels of pressure and violence faced by Christians in the country over the last five WWL reporting periods.

5 Year trends: Average pressure

| Iraq: WWL 2017 - WWL 2021 Persecution Pattern history | Average pressure over 5 Spheres of life |
|--|---|
| 2021 | 14.2 |
| 2020 | 14.1 |
| 2019 | 14.1 |
| 2018 | 14.9 |
| 2017 | 15.2 |

The average pressure over all 5 WWL reporting periods has been at an extreme level and would appear to be leveling off at just over 14 points. The overall decrease in pressure since WWL 2017 (which was the reporting period when IS was at its maximum territorial power) reflects the territorial defeat and expulsion of the radical Islamic group.


5 Year trends: Pressure in each sphere of life



WWL 2017 - WWL 2021 Persecution Pattern for Iraq (Spheres of life)

The chart above shows that the pressure in all *spheres of life* has diminished since WWL 2017 but is still at an extreme level (except for *Private life*, where the level is at the top end of 'very high'). For most *spheres of life* the level of pressure in WWL 2019 - WWL 2021 is comparable to that of a few years prior to IS expansion in Iraq (not shown in this table). The territorial defeat and expulsion of IS caused a reduction of pressure in *Church life* in particular.

5 Year trends: Violence against Christians



WWL 2017 - WWL 2021 Persecution Pattern for Iraq (Violence)

In the WWL 2019 and WWL 2020 reporting periods, violence against Christians showed a significant decrease, which reflected the territorial defeat and expulsion of IS. However, in the current WWL 2021 a sharp increase in violence was observed. This was mainly due to a significant number of churches being closed as well as an increase in the number of Christians abducted.

Gender-specific religious persecution / Female

| Female Pressure Points |
|--|
| Denied access to social community/networks |
| Denied custody of children |
| Denied legal ability to marry Christian spouse |
| Discrimination/harassment via education |
| Economic harassment via business/job/work access |
| Enforced religious dress code |
| Forced divorce |
| Economic harassment via business/job/work access Enforced religious dress code |

| Forced marriage |
|--|
| Incarceration by family (house arrest) |
| Targeted Seduction |
| Violence – death |
| Violence – physical |
| Violence – psychological |
| Violence – sexual |
| Violence – Verbal |

After years of violence, peace remains uncertain in Iraq. During the war against IS, IS was known for its atrocious treatment of women, especially using those from religious minorities for sexual enslavement. However, <u>no IS member</u> has been prosecuted or convicted for these crimes against women (Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: Events of 2019"). Women have few legal protections to protect them from gender-based violence and due to social stigma and retribution against both the victim and perpetrator, victims of sexual crimes do not usually report them to authorities. Rape victims – who can be forced to marry their rapist under Iraqi law – often choose not to report incidents of assault to avoid such a fate.

In some areas, Christian women and girls choose to wear veils (as Islamic women do) for their own safety. Unveiled women in Baghdad and Basra are likely to be harassed or even pelted with stones. For Christian women, this is compounded by the fact there is general impunity for violations against Christians, be it stealing property, kidnapping, sexual abuse or corruption. Often, when the perpetrator has higher connections and higher status, they will win the case, especially under the tribal justice system which can override national justice.

Female converts from Islam are most vulnerable to violations of their fundamental rights for their faith. Pressure comes most often from the wider family. A convert risks abuse in the form of house arrest, beatings, sexual harassment, rape and even being killed to restore the 'honor' to the family. "Several girls have been killed," a country expert explained, "although this never reaches the news." A female convert might also be divorced by her husband and lose custody of her children; while both male and female converts risk being divorced by their non-believing spouse, Iraqi divorce laws make women more vulnerable as they have fewer legal rights.

If single, a female convert may be forcibly married to a conservative Muslim. The attitude of the spouse's family is crucial in this issue. Further adding challenges, female converts from Islam cannot officially marry male Christians, as the Iraqi state still considers them to be Muslims; Muslim women are not allowed to marry non-Muslims.

Single Christian girls without convert background have also been reportedly 'lured' by Muslim men, who then harass them and force them into marriage. On a community level, in state schools, Christian girls are seen as weaker and are often ridiculed for their faith. They are reportedly under pressure to convert to Islam and their grades can be impacted if they openly challenge concepts which contradict their Christian faith, or simply because the teacher does not want to give higher grades to a Christian over a Muslim. They are also viewed as being women who are loose and free because they attend parties and do not wear Islamic clothing. As a country expert explained: "This is because people interpret the Christian religion as meaning: I'm free to do what I like." Women have reported that they have suffered sexual harassment and vulgar threats because of this perception. In one instance, a young Muslim man took pictures of Christian girls without their permission. When asked why he did so without consent, he replied: "They are Christian girls, and I have the right to do anything with them."

In conclusion, Christian women – especially converts from Islam - suffer from unequal treatment in all sectors of society.

Gender-specific religious persecution / Male

| Male Pressure Points |
|--|
| Abduction |
| Economic harassment via business/job/work access |
| Forced out of home – expulsion |
| Forced to flee town/country |
| Imprisonment by government |
| Violence – death |
| Violence – psychological |
| Violence – Verbal |

Christian men are at risk of being targets for various forms of violence; particularly former Muslims are in a very vulnerable position and struggle to sustain their families. Job discrimination affects men belonging to all WWL categories of Christian communities, especially those working in the public sector. Christians in central and south Iraq have been put under pressure to leave their jobs, especially if they are working for foreign organizations or are employed at higher levels of society (e.g. government companies). In the north, Christians often struggle to get employment and allegedly feel vulnerable and prone to exploitation at their workplaces. Christian business owners also face discrimination, causing many to emigrate. In Mosul and Baghdad, they cannot start a business unless a Muslim associate is involved, and they may have their business boycotted if their faith is discovered. In this mostly traditional and tribal Iraqi society, men are often the primary breadwinners for their families and losing their jobs can have a considerable effect on Christian families. The consequences of this can be far-reaching for their families, who apart from being left without income, often face emotional trauma if the man flees or is killed.

Male converts from a Muslim background are particularly vulnerable to violations. In a culture where retaining honor is everything, they risk being ejected from their families, threatened or killed. Men from a non-Muslim Christian background also risk being killed for their faith, the perpetrators being mostly violent Islamic militants.

These factors greatly increase the already strong motivations for emigration. The loss of Christian men not only affects their direct families, but also the local churches which consequently find themselves confronted with a lack of potential leadership. Further weakening the church, priests are sometimes targeted if they speak out against armed groups, or are occasionally kidnapped by jihadists.

Persecution of other religious minorities

Other religious minorities facing persecution, discrimination and intolerance in Iraq are Yezidis, Kakai, Sabaean-Mandaeans, Bahai, Zoroastrians and Jews. Especially Yezidis are known to have suffered atrocities under IS and more Yezidi than Christian women and girls were taken as sex slaves by IS. Also, more Yezidis than Christians were murdered by IS. The <u>Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization</u> (UNPO) reported on 7 June 2018 that in "August 2014, around 3,100 Yazidis were killed in the Mount Sinjar area while 6,800 were kidnapped to become sex slaves or fighters". Nearly 3,000 Yezidi women and girls are currently still missing, according to the <u>US State Department's IRF 2019 report</u> (pages 188-194). Little to nothing has been done to bring the perpetrators of the Yezidi genocide to justice or to assist the minority in resettling in Sinjar and other former habitats in Iraq, in spite of Yezidi leaders' demands. They are currently under threat of Turkish air strikes in the Sinjar region and also under pressure caused by various militia groups, which makes it impossible for them to rebuild their lives after IS. Turkey has targeted the Sinjar region since 2017, including a series of airstrikes in 2020. Two thirds of Yazdi IDPS have still not returned and "continue to endure a challenging life in more than 15 camps in the Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq" (USCIRF, 2019).

Whereas the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion for Christians, Yezidis and Sabean-Mandaeans, it does not explicitly protect adherents of other religions or atheists. The Bahai faith and Wahhabi Sunni Islam are prohibited by law:. Considered apostates of Islam, Bahai face higher pressure than most Christians, with the exception of converts to Christianity. Practicing the Bahai faith can be punished by law with 10 years' imprisonment. However this ban is not enforced in KRG where the Bahai faith is recognized as a religion. Also in other parts of the country this law is generally not applied.

According to the penal code, Jews are not allowed to hold government jobs (e.g. in state enterprises) or join the army. Widespread discrimination against the few Jews left in Iraq makes them avoid public self-identification for fear of provoking violence.

Future outlook

The outlook for Christians as viewed through the lens of:

Islamic oppression

Based on <u>Garda World's forecast</u> (last updated 19 September 2020), the threat of the Persecution engine *Islamic oppression* is not expected to diminish significantly in the short-term: "There is an increased risk of attacks and kidnap targeting Western individuals. The Islamic State is consolidating its presence primarily in Diyala province using hideouts in connecting mountain ranges. Improvised explosive device attacks in these areas target security forces vehicles. The Islamic State will likely exploit the partial withdrawal of US forces, with more complex attacks against security forces and energy assets in central and northern Iraq."

Since Christians are often considered as an extension of the USA or the West in general, this increased risk of attacks and kidnappings can also affect them. Therefore, Christians in Iraq are concerned that the absence of US troops will make minority communities extra vulnerable to attacks by IS. IS ideology is still very much alive and is not limited to geographical territory. In an effort to prove they are still relevant, IS militants continue to execute and inspire attacks in the West, Middle East and elsewhere. Meanwhile, thousands of fleeing IS militants have "disappeared" into the civilian population of the Nineveh Plains – adding to feelings of insecurity for religious minorities such as Christians. IS is regrouping and it is reported that there are many sleeper cells; in August 2018 it was estimated that there were probably <u>17,000 IS militants</u> still in Iraq (The Independent, 15 August, 2018). There have been some attacks on villages and there is fear that more will happen in the near future. There are also al-Qaeda remnants, Shiite militias and other militant Islamic groups emerging.

In an attempt to gain control over its own territory, the Bagdad government decided to bring "Popular Mobilization Units" (PMU militias, particularly the majority Shiite Shabak 30 brigade) under its control through integration into the regular army, There was fierce opposition which led to fighting between the army and the militias. Shabak militias have accused Christians of supporting this step. Until now, the government's move does not seem to be successful. If this situation continues, there is a risk of it spilling over into a wider conflict that could also affect Christians. Pressure also comes from Shiite leaders and government officials who sometimes make offensive public statements against Christians. Meanwhile in the IKR in the north, the focus on Islamic identity is reportedly increasing.

Also in politics and in society in general, the emphasis on the role of Islam is strong and this confines Christians within narrow socio-political limits. At the juridical level, Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities are concerned about the suggested changes to the legislation ruling the Federal Court of Iraq. As a result of these proposed changes, four judges would be added, all scholars of Islamic jurisprudence who have voting powers. Since the Federal Court plays an important role in interpreting the Constitution and federal laws, Iraq's civil movements consider these proposals to be signs of a further Islamization of the country. Consequently, *Islamic oppression* is expected to continue to be a threat to Iraq's Christians, leading to high levels of fear and encouraging them to emigrate.

Clan oppression

After the defeat of IS and the withdrawal of *Peshmerga* troops from Kirkuk, Iraqi parliamentary elections in May 2018 represented an attempt to reduce ethnic and sectarian conflicts. However, the loss of a common enemy and the subsequent power vacuum are likely to continue to increase divisions between tribal and sectarian groups, making the influence of the persecution engine *Clan oppression* stronger. Pressure will thereby increase on all Christians, including those in Kurdish areas - but particularly on those from a Muslim background, who suffer most where this engine is strong.

Dictatorial paranoia

Iraq has parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2021. However, according to the <u>Economist</u> <u>Intelligence Unit</u>'s forecast (accessed 11 December 2020), there are "major risks that the polls will be delayed or deemed illegitimate—both scenarios would lead to the re-emergence of nationwide protests". Amidst the increased tensions between different population groups, Christians face the risk of being caught between clashing parties, leading to Christians relocating to safer areas. They could also be pulled along or used in the political power-struggle, a development which will cause the persecution engine *Dictatorial paranoia* to grow in influence. Iran's influence in Iraq - also through state-sponsored Shiite militias could lead to repercussions for Iraqi Christians who have always been seen as agents of the West. Moreover, certain PMU militias are accused of receiving arms from Iran and of allowing a headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to be set up in areas under their control. This could turn Iraq into a potential conflict zone for possible military confrontation between Iran and the USA. The persecution engine *Dictatorial paranoia* is also evident where the central Iraqi government fails to support a pluralistic society in which religious minorities such as Christians would be truly welcome.

Organized corruption and crime

Nationwide mass protests against corruption, unemployment and Iran's influence that broke out in many cities in October 2019, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. Christian representatives in the 2018 parliamentary elections were put under pressure by Shia and Kurdish parties to serve their interests. Corruption is deeply rooted in Iraqi society and rampant in both IKR and Baghdad governments and there is a long road ahead. If economic and political instability continues, organized corruption and crime is likely to thrive. Given the COVID-19 crisis, no early improvement in the economic situation is to be expected, meaning that Christians and other minorities are likely to suffer even more from this engine in the near future.

Christian denominational protectionism

It is hard to say how this persecution engine will develop. In the recent past, Christians of many different denominations have worked together well, especially in the area of relief aid. The relationship between Historical Christian communities and non-traditional Christian communities however remains complex and some reports point to a recent increase in tension. The need to cooperate still exists but the increased fragmentation along tribal lines (and survival sentiments) could also work against this. Frequently, *Christian denominational protectionism* is

just one factor in the wider debate surrounding the future of Christians in the country and their socio-political and national identity.

External Links - Persecution Dynamics

- Drivers of persecution description: 2019 International Religious Freedom Report https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iraq/
- Drivers of persecution description: International Religious Freedom Report 2018 https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/IRAQ-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf
- Drivers of persecution description: 2019 International Religious Freedom Report https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iraq/
- Pressure in Block 2 / Family sphere: eligibility for government benefits https://www.state.gov/reports/2018report-on-international-religious-freedom/iraq/
- Violence / Block 6 commentary: Erdogan stated in a speech in August 2020 https://www.memri.org/tv/turkish-president-erdogan-conquest-region-allahs-justice-do-not-test-couragecapabilities-patience
- Gender-specific religious persecution Female description: no IS member https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2020/country-chapters/iraq#0ed443
- Persecution of other religious minorities: Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization https://unpo.org/article/20889
- Persecution of other religious minorities: US State Department's IRF 2019 report https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf
- Future outlook: Garda World's forecast https://www.garda.com/crisis24/country-reports/iraq
- Future outlook: 17,000 IS militants https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-fightersiraq-syria-un-report-jihadis-raqqa-iraq-a8492736.html
- Future outlook: Economist Intelligence Unit http://country.eiu.com/iraq

Further useful reports

A selection of in-depth reports and smaller articles are available on World Watch Research's Open Doors Analytical website (password: freedom) and on the World Watch Monitor website:

- http://opendoorsanalytical.org/reports/
- <u>http://opendoorsanalytical.org/?s=Iraq</u>
- <u>https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/countries/Iraq</u>
- Iraq and Syria The enduring relevance of the church in the Middle East: December 2017
- Understanding the recent movements of Christians leaving Syria and Iraq: June 2017
- The role and contribution of Christians in Syria and Iraq Summary report April 2016
- Future role and contribution of Christians in Syria and Irag April 2016
- Historic Relevance of the Church in Syria and Iraq March 2016
- <u>Current Relevance of the Church in Syria and Iraq February 2016</u>

External Links - Further useful reports

- Further useful reports: Iraq and Syria The enduring relevance of the church in the Middle East: December 2017 - http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Iraq-and-Syria-The-enduring-relevanceof-the-church-in-the-Middle-East.pdf
- Further useful reports: Understanding the recent movements of Christians leaving Syria and Iraq: June 2017 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Understanding-the-recent-movements-of-Christians-leaving-Syria-and-Iraq.-Hope-for-the-Middle-East.pdf

- Further useful reports: The role and contribution of Christians in Syria and Iraq Summary report April 2016
 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The-role-and-contribution-of-Christians-in-Syria-and-Iraq-Summary-report-April-2016.pdf
- Further useful reports: Future role and contribution of Christians in Syria and Iraq April 2016 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Future-role-and-contribution-of-Christians-in-Syria-and-Iraq-April-2016.pdf
- Further useful reports: Historic Relevance of the Church in Syria and Iraq March 2016 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Historic-Relevance-of-the-Church-in-Syria-and-Iraq-March-2016.pdf
- Further useful reports: Current Relevance of the Church in Syria and Iraq February 2016 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Current-Relevance-of-the-Church-in-Syria-and-Iraq-February-2016.pdf